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LOSING THE WAR AGAINST DIRTY MONEY: 
RETHINKING GLOBAL STANDARDS ON 
PREVENTING MONEY LAill~DERING AND 
TERRORISM FINANCING 
RICHARD K. GORDON' 
"We must now wage an all-out war to prevent money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism. "1 
"One and one is two. 
Two and two is four. 
I feel so bad 
'Cause I'm losing the war."2 
INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the 1970s, there has been a sustained and increasingly 
global interest in stopping money laundering. 3 The reasons are hardly 
© 2011 Richard K. Gordon. 
' Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor of 
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author's alone and should not be attributable to the International Monetary Fund. Thanks to Jonathan 
Adler, Craig Boise, David Chaikin, Graeme Cooper, Erik Jensen, Peter Gerhart, Willie Maddox, 
Richard Vann, Alvin Warren, Mira Kasliwal, and Emile van de Does de Willebois. 
I. Jochen Sanio, President, Financial Action Task Force and President, Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office, Federal Republic of Germany, Washington D.C., August 8, 2002. 
2. Mel Brooks, The Producers (1968). 
3. For example, the first anti-money laundering law enacted in the U.S. was The Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (Bank Secrecy Act) P.L. 91-508, Titles I and II (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951-59 (2000) and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2000) [hereinafter 
Currency Reporting Act]). Anti-money laundering laws were expanded in 1986, 88, 92, 94, 96, 2001, 
and 2004. FinCEN, HistOIJ' of Anti-money Laundering Laws, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ 
aml_history.html (FinCEN is the U.S. financial intelligence Unit). See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, 
Criminal Law: The Tenuous Relationship Between the Fight Against A1oney Laundering 01_1d the 
Dis111ptian of Criminal Finance, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311, 336-64 (2003) [heremafter 
Cuellar, Criminal Lmv]. The European Union's efforts began in 1991 with its first anti-money 
laundering Directive (Council Directive 911308/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 1 66) (EC)) and were expanded 
significantly with the second and third anti-money laundering Directives in 2001 (Council Directive 
2001/97/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 344) (EC)) and 2004 (Council Directive 2005/60/EC, 2005 0.1. (L 309) 
(EC)). See Alan E. Sorcher, Lost In Implementation: Financial Institutions Face Challenges Complying 
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complex. Law enforcement may be able to follow a money trail of criminal 
proceeds to find the perpetrator or use the proceeds as evidence in a 
prosecution.4 The state may also be able to confiscate the ill-gotten gains.5 
Criminals, therefore, seek to disguise the illegal origins of the proceeds of 
crime and their ownership of the proceeds.6 At least in theory, preventing 
With Anti-lvfoney Laundering Lmvs, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 395, 408-10, 414 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sorcher; Lost In Implementation]. The first multilateral convention including anti-money laundering 
provisions came into force in 1988. United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N. T.S. 95, available at http:// 
www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This was followed by 
conventions expanding anti-money laundering provisions. The Council of Europe Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ETS No. 141 (entered into 
force 1993 ), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Htrnl/14l.htm [hereinafter 
Strasbourg Convention]; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Sept. 29, 
2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209, available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/ 
TOC%20Convention/T0Cebook-e.pdf. The Financial Action Task Force published its first set of 40 
Recommendations on money laundering in 1990. These original Recommendations were revised and 
expanded in 1996. FINANCIAl. ACTION TASK FORCE FOI<TY RECOMMENDATIONS ON MONEY 
LAUNDERING 2 (June 28, 1996). A revised version was issued in 2003, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/28/0,3746,en_32250379 _32236920_33658140_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html [hereinafter FATF 
40 Recommendations]. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 the FATF added 8 Special 
Recommendations against Terrorism Finance; a 9th Recommendation was added in 2004. FATF, 
Terrorist Financing, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_322503 79 _32236947 
_1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.htm1 [hereinafter IX Special Reconunendations]. 
4. Large amounts of cash can be bulky, hard to move, and draw the attention of law enforcement, 
Richard Gordon, T1ysts or Terrorists? Financial Institutions and the Search for Bad Guys, 43 WAXE 
FOREST L. REv. 699, 708-09 (2008) [hereinafter Gordon, T1ysts or Terrorists], while checks, credit 
cards, etc., can create a financial trail linking funds to the person(s) making the payment. ROGER C. 
MOLANDER, B. DAVID MUSSINGTON & PETER A. WILSON, CYBERPAYMENTS AND MONEY 
LAUNDERING (1998). 
5. For a history of forfeih1re laws in the U.S., see David J. Fried, Criminal Lmv: Rationalizing 
Criminal FO!feiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328,335-57 (1988) and Barclay Thomas Johnson, 
Restoring Civility-the Civil Asset Fol}eiture Reji:mn Act of 2000: Baby Steps Towards a More Civilized 
Civil F01jeiture System, 35 IND. L. REV. 1045, 1047-53, 1070-73 (2001). Vienna Convention, supra 
note 3, at Art. 5 (limited to the proceeds of narcotics trafficking), Strasbourg Convention, supra note 3, 
at Art. 2, Palermo Convention, supra note 3, at Art. 12, and the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money 
Laundering, supra note 3, at Recmm11endation 3, require the adoption of forfeiture laws for the 
proceeds of crime. 
6. "When a criminal activity generates substantial profits, the individual or group involved must 
find a way to control the fimds without attracting attention to the underlying activity or the persons 
involved ... _ In the initial -or placement -stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his 
illegal profits into the financial system .... After the funds have entered the financial system, the 
second-or layering-stage takes place. In this phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions 
or movements of the fi.mds to distance them from their source .... Having successfully processed his 
criminal profits through the first two phases the launderer then moves them to the third stage -
integration- in which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy." FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, 
MONEY LAUNDERING FAQ, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,3343,en_32250379 
_3223 5720 _336596 I 3 _1_ I_l_ I ,OO.html. 
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criminals from succeeding makes it harder for them to benefit from their 
. 7 
crnnes. 
Over the past forty years anti-money lalmdering mles have been 
expanded, refined a bit, but rarely completely re-thought or substantially 
rewritten. 8 The vast majority of the world's jurisdictions now endorse the 
latest version of the Financial Action Task Force's Forty Recommendations 
on Money Laundering ("FATF 40 Recommendations")9 and accompanying 
Methodology for Assessment. 10 Stmiing in 1990, these global standards 
7. "[T]argeting the money laundering aspect of criminal activity and depriving the criminal of his 
ill-gotten gains means hitting him where he is vulnerable. Without a usable profit, the criminal activity 
will not continue." I d. 
8. For example, in the U.S., the first anti-money laundering rule focused on the placement stage 
(the launderer introduces his illegal profits into the financial system) by requiring financial institutions 
to identifY clients, keep certain client records, and report cash deposits in excess of $10,000. Bank 
Secrecy Act, supra note 3. Future laws extend the definition of financial institutions, enhanced record-
keeping rules, and added a requirement to monitor client activity and report suspicious activities. 
FinCEN, History of Anti-money Laundering Laws, supra note 3. Since the FATF's first set of 40 
Recommendations on Money Laundering the definition of financial institution has been extended (and 
certain requirements have been extended to include some persons who are not financial institutions) and 
rules on record-keeping have been tightened, but the general framework of client identification, 
recordkeeping, client monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities has not changed. F ATF 40 
Reconunendations (1 990) and FATF 40 Recommendations (1996), supra note 3, at Recommendations 
11-15; FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendations 5-16. 
9. According to the FATF 130 countries have endorsed the 40. FATF 40 Recommendations, 
supra note 3, at Introduction. In 2002 the International Monetary Fund [IMF] endorsed the FATF 40 
Recommendations (and the FATF VIII Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (2001), which 
were amended in 2004 to include Special Recommendation IX, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pd1). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, IMF ADVANCES EFFORTS 
TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCE, Public Information Notice No. 02/87, 
August 8, 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0287.htm; INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF PLENARY MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR 
THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT) STANDARD I (2002), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/ll 0802.pdf. Because nearly every 
country in the world is a member of the IMF this endorsement has significant resonance. IMF Members' 
Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
sec/memdir/members.htm. More importantly, each member of the F ATF and each of the eight FA TF 
associate members and FA TF-style regional bodies has endorsed the FA TF 40 Recommendations and 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing as the global standard for anti- money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, MEMBERS AND 
OBSERVERS, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documentl52/0,3343,en _32250379 _32236869 
_34027188_1_1_1_1,00.btml (providing web links to each FATF associate member and FATF-style 
regional body); see also PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORJSM Ill-7 - III-13 (2d ed. 2006), available at 
http:i/siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871/Reference _Guide 
_AMLCFT _2ndSupplement.pdf [hereinafter SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE]. 
10. FD,ANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available ar 
http://www .fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/54/403 3 9628 .pdf [hereinafter Methodology]. 
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have required financial institutions 11 to monitor the transactions of their 
customers and to report to special government authorities (known as 
financial intelligence units) those transactions they suspect might involve 
the proceeds of crime, 12 and since 2001, the financing of tenorism. 13 
Financial intelligence units then analyze the reports along with other data 
and make recommendations to law enforcement as to which clients or 
transactions should be investigated. 14 
The tenorist attacks of September 11, 2001 greatly intensified the 
global "war" on money laundering and, for the first time, on terrorism 
financing. 15 In 2002, the International Monetary Fund and the World Banlc 
adopted the F ATF 40 Recommendations and the eight new Special 
Recommendations on Terrorism Financing as a world standard. 16 They, 
along with the Financial Action Task Force and various regional anti-
money laundering groups, also began a joint global compliance program by 
assessing the extent to which individual countries were implementing those 
standards. 17 Failure to implement the standards adequately can result in a 
broad application of sanctions or countermeasures, including bans on doing 
business with financial institutions located within the borders of non-
11. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FATF PLENARY 
MEETING AND PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
(AMLICFT) STANDARD I (2002), available at http://www.irnf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/ 
eng/ 11 0802.pdf [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE METHODOLOGY]. 
12. FATF 40 Recommendations (1990) and FATF 40 Recommendations (1996), supra note 3, at 
Recommendations ll-15; FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendations 5-16. 
13. FA TF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (200 I), supra note 9. 
14. SCHOTT, REFERENCE GliTDE, supra note 9, at V!I-3. 
15. Richard K. Gordon, 011 the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and 
Offihore Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 564 (2010) [hereinafter Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of 
Standards jar Law]. 
16. IMF ADVANCES EFFORTS TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCE, 
Public Information Notice No. 02/87 (August 8, 2002), available at http://www.irnf.org/external/np/sec/ 
pn/2002/pn0287 .htm. 
17. A unitonn system of assessment, including a single assessment methodology, was agreed to 
by the lfv[f, the World Bank, and the FATF in 2002. PROPOSAL FOR THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE 
METHODOlOGY, supra note 11, at 2. IMF assessment reports can be found at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/ns/cs.aspx?id= 175 and World Banlc assessments at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNALITOPICS/EXTF!NANCIALSECTOR/EXT AMLIO,contentMDK:2199590 l-menuPK:396 
518-pagePK:l48956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:396512,00.html. These bodies and each of the eight 
FA TF associate members and FATF-style regional bodies (many of which are undertaken with the 
participation of the IMF and World Banlc) use the uniform assessment system. FA TF assessments can 
be found at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417 ,en_32250379 _32236963 _l_l_l_l_l,OO.html and 
those of regional bodies can be found at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2 
.htm#reports. 
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complying jurisdictions. 18 As a result, millions of suspicious transaction 
reports have been forwarded to financial intelligence units by financial 
institutions throughout the world, 19 although how many have resulted in 
further investigation, prosecution, and conviction is not publically 
available.20 
These measures to prevent money laundering and ten·orism financing 
in the financial sector have been endorsed by nearly every country in the 
world. 21 The only major problem is that they do not seem to work.22 In fact, 
this Article argues they cannot work, and that they need to be rethought. 
The Article suggests that the long-accepted view that such a significant 
amount of criminal law enforcement should be left in private hands23 is 
wrong. Instead, the government should unde1iake the key role financial 
institutions cunently play in deciding if their clients are possible money 
launderers or ten·01ists. The miicle also argues that financial intelligence 
units should make such detenninations in ways that are analogous to how 
some advanced country revenue authorities select income tax retums for 
audit, particularly the United States Intemal Revenue Service. Financial 
institutions, this Aliicle suggests, should be relegated to repmiing only 
objective infonnation on customers and transactions in much the way that 
18. For example, under Title lii, Sec. 311(a) of the U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT, Pub.L. 107-56 (2001), 
31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5), the Secretary of the Treasury may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the 
opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent account or payable· through account by 
any domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking 
institution, if he determines ihat the institution is inadequately applying appropriate anti-money 
laundering/terrorism financing rules. FATF Recommendation 21 states, "[f]inancial institutions should 
give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and 
financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply the F ATF Recommendations . 
. . . Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FA TF Recommendations, 
countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures." 
19. Telephone Interview with Rick McDonnell, Staff Director, FATF, in Paris, Fr. (Feb. 28, 2010) 
[hereinafter McDonnell Interview]. In the U.S. alone, depository institutions filed over 4 nullion 
suspicious transaction reports between April 1996 and June 2009. The U.S. refers to suspicious 
transaction reports as suspicious activity reports or SARs. FinCEN, 13 SAR Review by the Numbers, 
Suspicious Activity Report FORM TD F-90-22.47, Suspicious Activity Report by Depository 
Institution, Exhibit 1: Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year & Month, April 1, 1996 through June 
30, 2009 (January 2010), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/sar _by_ numb _13 .pdf 
[hereinafter FinCEN SAR Reviews]. 
20. E-mail from Boudewijn Verhelst, President, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, to 
author (Feb. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Verhelst e-mail]. 
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
22. This view has been expressed by many commentators, including governmental and private 
sector practitioners and acadenlics. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
23. For purposes of this Article "private" includes state-owned financial institutions and others 
subject to preventive measures requirements. This is because state-owned persons are subject to most of 
the same constraints, incentives, and disincentives with respect to those requirements as are private, 
fully for-profit institutions. 
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certain third parties must report taxpayer transactions to revenue 
authorities. 
Following a brief overview in Part I.A of the overall system to prevent 
money laundering, Part I.B desc1ibes the role of the private sector, which is 
to identifY customers, create a profile of their legitimate activities, keep 
detailed records of clients and their transactions, monitor their transactions 
to see if they confonn to their profile, examine further any unusual 
transactions, and repmt to the government any suspicious transactions. Part 
I.C continues the description of the preventive measures system by 
describing the government's role, which is to assist the private sector in 
identifying suspicious transactions, ensure compliance with the preventive 
measures requirements, and analyze suspicious transaction reports to 
detern1ine those that should be investigated. 
Parts I.D and I.E examine the effectiveness of this system. Part I.D 
discusses successes and failures in the private sector's role. Borrowing from 
theory concerning the effectiveness of private sector unftmded mandates, 
this Pari reviews why many aspects of the system are failing, focusing on 
the subjectivity of the mandate, the disincentives to comply, and the lack of 
comprehensive data on client identification and transactions. It notes that 
the system includes an inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked 
with infonning the private sector how best to detect launderers and 
ten·orists, but to do so could act as a road map on how to avoid detection 
should such infonnation fall into the wrong hands. Pari I.D discusses how 
financial institutions do not and cmmot use scientifically tested statistical 
means to detennine if a particular client or set of transactions is more likely 
than others to indicate criminal activity. Part I.D then turns to a discussion 
of a few issues regarding the impact the system has but that are not related 
to effectiveness, followed by a summary and analysis of how flaws might 
be addressed. 
Pari I.E continues by discussing the successes and failures in the 
public sector's role. It reviews why the system is failing, focusing on the 
lack of assistance to the private sector in and the lack of necessary data on 
client identification and transactions. It also discusses how fmancial 
intelligence units, like financial institutions, do not and cmmot use 
scientifically tested statistical means to detennine probabilities of criminal 
activity. Part I concludes with a summary and analysis tying both private 
and public roles together. 
Part II then turns to a review of certain current techniques for selecting 
income tax returns for audit. After an overview of the system, Pari II first 
discusses the limited role of the private sector in providing tax 
administrators with infonnation, comparing this to the far greater role the 
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private sector plays in implementing preventive measures. Next, this Pmi 
tums to consider how tax administrators, particularly the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service, select taxpayers for audit, comparing this to the role of 
both the private and public sectors in implementing preventive measures. It 
focuses on how some tax administrations use scientifically tested statistical 
means to determine probabilities of tax evasion. Part II then suggests how 
flaws in both private and public roles of implementing money laundeting 
and terrorism financing preventive measures might be theoretically 
addressed by bon-owing from the experience of tax administration. Pmi II 
concludes with a shmi summary and analysis that relates these conclusions 
to the preventive measures system. 
Referring to the analyses in Pmis I and II, Pali III suggests changes to 
the cunent preventive measures standard. It suggests that financial 
intelligence units should be uniquely tasked with analyzing and selecting 
clients and transactions for further investigation for money laundering and 
tenmism financing. The private sector's role should be restricted to 
identifying customers, creating an initial profile of their legitimate 
activities, and reporting such information and all client transactions to 
financial intelligence units. 
I. CURRENT STANDARDS FOR PREVENTING MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING IN THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
A. System Overview 
The F ATF's 40 Recommendations and the Special Recommendations 
are designed to "provide an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent 
framework of measures for combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing." 24 Together they cover, among other things, the criminalization 
of money laundering and tenorism financing, the freezing and seizing of 
criminal proceeds and of tenorism funds, key preventive measures against 
laundering and tenorism financing for financial institutions and other 
institutions subject to preventive measures, financial intelligence units, and 
intemational cooperation.Z5 The 40 Recmmnendations have included 
24. F ATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Introduction. 
25. The FATF 40 Recommendations are broken down into four groups. These are Group A: Legal 
Systems, and include the scope of the criminal offence of money laundering (I and 2) and provisional 
measures and confiscation (3); Group B: Measures to be taken by Financial Institutions and (certain) 
Nonfinancial Businesses and Professions to Prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, and 
include prohibition on shell banks (4), customer due diligence and record-keeping (including client 
identification and transaction monitoring) (5-12), reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance 
(including internal training and audit programs)(l3-16), other measures to deter money laundering and 
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similar preventive measure requirements since the original 1990 draft.26 In 
effect, these Recommendations divide the responsibility for preventing and 
lmcove1ing money lanndering between the p1ivate and public sector. 
B. Private Sector Role 
FATF Recommendations 5 through 13 plus 21 and 22 (and the 
relevant materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of 
compliance) set out the part of the preventive measures system that applies 
to the private sector. Unfommately these Recommendations are not a 
model of clarity and are not easy for non-experts to comprehend.27 
However, they are designed to create a five-part requirement:28 (1) 
terrorist financing (including sanctions for failure to comply with the Recommendations) (!7-20), 
measures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply with the FA TF 
Recommendations (21-22), and regulation and supervision (23-25); Group C: Institutional and other 
Measures Necessary in Systems for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and 
include competent authorities, their powers and resources (including the establishment of a financial 
intelligence unit) (26-32) and transparency of legal persons and arrangements (33 and 34); and Group 
D: International Co-operation, including implement various treaties (35), mutual legal assistance and 
extradition (36-39), and other forms of co-operation (40). The IX Special Recommendations include 
ratification and implementation of UN instruments (I), criminalizing the financing of terrorism and 
associated money laundering (II), freezing and confiscating terrorist assets (III), reporting suspicious 
transactions related to terrorism (also required in Recommendation 13) (IV), international co-operation, 
(pay special attention to) alternative remittance systems (VI), (special rules on) wire transfers (VII), 
(pay special attention to) non-profit organizations (VIII), and cash comiers (IX). F ATF 40 
Recommendations and IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3. 
26. Since 1990 there has been a progressive expansion of those persons who must follow the 
"preventive measures" provisions in the F ATF 40 Recommendations. FA TF Recommendations ( 1990), 
supra note 3 at Recommendation 5, FA TF Recommendations ( 1996 ), supra note 3 at Recommendation 
5. The current definition of financial instil1ltions includes include any person who engages in 
acceptance of deposits and other repayable fi.mds from the public; lending; financial leasing; the transfer 
of money or value; issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, checks, 
traveler's checks, money orders and banlcers' drafts, electronic money); financial guarantees and 
commitments; trading in money market instmments (checks, bills, COs, detivatives etc.), foreign 
exchange, exchange, interest rate and index instruments, transferable securities, conunodity fittures 
trading; participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues; 
individual and collective pmifolio management; safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid 
securities on behalf of other persons; otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money 
on behalf of other persons; and underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment 
related insurance, money, and currency changing. Methodology, supra note I 0, at 65-66. Since 2003 
most of the preventive measures prescribed for financial institutions have been extended to certain 
designated non-financial businesses and persons, including casinos (which also includes internet 
casinos), real estate agents, dealers in precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, and 
other independent legal professionals and accountants, and tmst and company service providers. !d. at 
62. 
27. In 2002 an attempt was made by the International Monetary Fund to reorganize the preventive 
measures Recommendations into a more accessible, coherent whole. However, in a series of meetings 
in 2002 delegations to the FA TF rejected the effort. 
28. A working group consisting of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, the World Bank, and the IMF has drafted a model regulation for the prevention of 
2011] LOSING TI-lE WAR AGAINST DIRTY MONEY 511 
establish and maintain customer identity (including beneficial owner and 
controller of the legal title holder of the account); (2) create and maintain 
an up-to-date customer profile;29 (3) monitor transactions to see if they fit 
with the customer profile of transactions that are legitimate; ( 4) if not, 
examine further any such tr·ansaction to see if it might represent the 
proceeds of c1ime or financing of tenorism, including by examining the 
source of funds; and (5) if so, report the transaction to the financial 
intelligence unit, along with a description of why the financial institution 
believes that the transaction is suspicious. 30 Recommendations 18, 19, and 
26 through 34 (and the relevant mate1ials in the accompanying 
Methodology for assessment of compliance) address both the supervisory 
system to ensure that the private sector complies with their preventive 
measures requirements and the criminal investigation and prosecution 
system. 
As shall be seen, the private sector's role focuses on three basic 
objectives. The first is to help exclude from the financial system possible 
criminal and terrorist elements. It does this by making financial institutions 
and other institutions subject to preventive measures identify and profile 
potential (and, periodically, existing) customers to screen out possible 
criminals and tenorists.31 The second is to make available to law 
enforcement financial information that can be used in criminal 
investigations or as evidence in a prosecution. It does this by requi1ing the 
private sector to maintain records of the identity of all clients and their 
transactions.32 The third is to identify customers who might be criminals or 
terrorists so that law enforcement can decide whether to investigate and 
prosecute such persons. It does this by requiring the private sector to 
monitor customer tr·ansactions based on their profiles and repmi to law 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism as part of a model law on antimony laundering and 
terrorism financing. The Model Regulation implements these F ATF Reconm1endations based on the 
regulatory frameworks in the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Hong Kong. Article 5.l(a)-(e) of the Model 
Regulation outlines CDD as the "(a) identification of customers, including beneficial owners; (b) 
gathering of information on customers to create a customer profile; (c) application of acceptance 
policies to new customers; (d) maintenance of customer information on an ongoing basis; [and the] (e) 
monitoring of customer transactions." Model Regulation (2006) (on file with the U.N Office on Dmgs 
and Crime). Article 10 describes a customer profile as being "of sufficient nature and detail ... to 
monitor the customer's transactions, apply enhanced customer due diligence where necessary, and 
detect suspicious transactions." Jd 
29. If a new customer profile suggests that the customer is opening an account with proceeds of 
crime are involved the financial institution should go directly to Step 4. I d. 
30. See infi·a notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
3!. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement those that raise suspicion that criminal proceeds or terrorism 
financing are involved.33 
The United States largely complies with these requirements through 
statutory and regulat01y measures (although it does not extend these 
requirements to all those designated non-fmancial businesses and persons 
as defined in the Methodology), as well as through guidance issued to 
financial institutions.34 The European Union also largely complies through 
both Directives (essentially instructions to members of the Union) and 
implementing legislation at the member cmmhy leve1.35 The language used 
to implement the Recommendations is often similar to that found in the 
Recommendations. 36 
Experience suggests that while the second objective appears to work 
rather well, the first may work less well, and the third may rarely work at 
all.37 
1. Customer Identification, Customer Profiling, Record-Keeping 
FA TF Recommendation 5 requires that financial institutions identify 
their customers, including the beneficial owner of a customer account, 
which, in the case of legal persons (and other legal arrangements such as 
trusts), includes taking "reasonable measures" to identifY the physical 
33. See inji-a notes 52-64 and accompanying text. 
34. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, UNITED STATES OF ArviERICA 83-197 
(financial institutions), 198-226 (designated non-financial businesses and persons) (2006), available at 
http://www .fatf-gaft.org/da!aoecd/44/9/3 710 1772.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT]. See also M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: INTERNATIONAL MONEY 
LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCING ACT OF 2001, available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/ftnanciai/RL31208.pdf; Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just Watching You, 
He's Also Wasting Your Tax Payer Dollars: An Ana~vsis of the Anti-J'vfoney Laundering Provisions of 
the USA Patriot Act, 56 RUTGERS L REv. 573, 586 (2004). Regulations on customer identification are 
found in 3 l C.F .R. § I 03.121. 31 U.S .C. § 5314(b) (2006) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. It is implemented at 21 C.F.R. § 21.110. 
There are similar customer identification rules for securities broker-dealers, mutual funds, and futures 
commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities. Financial Recordkeeping and 
RepOiiing of Currenct and Foreign Transactions, 31 CFR § 103.122, 131 (2006); ASD, NOTICE TO 
MEMBERS 02-21 5-7 (2002); NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 03-34 (2003). Under 31 CFR § 103.137(c), 
a life insurer is required to have policies and procedures for obtaining "all relevant customer-related 
infonnation necessary for an effective anti-money laundering program." 
35. Sorcher, Lost in implementation, supra note 3, at 408-10. 
36. fn the course of his assessment work for the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
the author of this Article has reviewed implementing statutory and regulatory language in The British 
Virgin fslands, Hong Kong, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the United Kingdom and 
often found language nearly identical to that used in the Recommendations and Methodology. This may 
be due to decisions to enact the two verbatim so as to ensure that legislation complies with the standard. 
37. See infi'a Part J.D. 
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persons who own or control the legal person. 38 Reco1m11endation 12 
extends these requirements to certain designated non-financial businesses 
and persons, which include casinos (which often deal with cash that can be 
exchanged for chips and visa versa, providing laundering opportuilities ), 
real estate agents (in pmi because real estate is often of high value, it is 
often used as an investment vehicle by launderers), dealers in precious 
metals (included for similar reasons, plus the fact that the ownership of 
precious metals can be easily trm1sfeued), lawyers, notaries, and persons 
who assist in the setting up of tmsts and companies (these are often 
professionals who assist launderers in hiding assets). For simplicity this 
Aliicle will refer to those private sector persons subject to preventive 
measures requirements as "financial institutions and Designated 
NonFinancial Businesses and Professions ("DNFBP")."39 Although neither 
the Recommendation itself nor the Methodology uses the tenn "client 
profile," Recmmnendation 5 requires that the financial institution and 
DNFBP "detennine the purpose and intended nature of the business 
relationship" of a potential (and periodically, of a current) client and a 
"knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, 
where necessary, the source offunds."40 
This serves two purposes. If a potential client's identity m1d profile 
cannot be established, the financial institution and ce1iain others must 
tenninate the business relationship.41 Second, future transactions of 
accepted clients can be measured against this baseline of nonnal or typical 
transactions. Specifically, financial institutions and DNFBP must 
"understand the purpose, intended relationship, and conduct with the 
customer, undergo ongoing customer due diligence in the business 
relationship," and must undertake a "scrutiny of transactions through the 
course of the relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted 
are consistent with the institution's knowledge of the customer, its business 
and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds."42 In the 
event the financial institution and DNFBP cannot comply, the financial 
institution should terminate business relations or not lmdertake a 
38. FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendation 5. The Methodology 
allows an exception from this latter requirement in the event the legal person is a public company. 
Methodology, supra note 10, at Criterion 5.5.2(b). 
39. FATF 40 Recommendations (2003), supra note 3, at Recommendation 12. Recommendation 
22 requires that the principles applicable to financial institutions also be applied to branches and 
majority owned subsidiaries located abroad. I d. at Reconunendation 22. 
40. I d. at Recommendation 5. 
41. Recommendation 18 also forbids financial institutions to transact business with shell banks 
and "guard against" establishing relations with those that do. Jd. at Recommendation 18. 
42. I d. at Recommendation 5. 
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transaction.43 Second, the client profile allows the financial institution and 
DNFBP to monitor client transactions to see if they are unusual compared 
with the profile. 
A key development in the 2003 Recommendations was the adoption 
of an optional risk-based approach for ce1iain preventive measures.44 
According to the Financial Action Task Force the adoption of risk 
sensitivity "involve[s] identifying and categorizing money laundering risks 
and establishing reasonable controls based on risks identified .... "45 This 
1isk-based program contrasts with the previous one where each of the 
FATF Recommendations was to be implemented objectively regardless of 
relative risk levels.46 F ATF Recommendation 5 now allows fmancial 
institutions and DNFBP to detennine the extent of such measures on a risk-
sensitive basis, depending on the type of customer, business relationship, or 
transaction.47 Other Recommendations address new teclmologies and 
reliance on third parties for due diligence.48 
43. It should also be made mandatory to tile a suspicious transaction report to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit, but is not required to do so. !d. at Recommendation 13. 
44. This had been highly controversial. During this time the author participated in many of the 
FATF working group meetings conceming adoption of such an approach. The 1996 version of the 
Recommendations did not include any references to a risk-based approach. The author was present 
during many of these discussions. 
45. FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 1-2 (2007), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/46/38960576.pdf (hereinafter FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-
BASED APPROACH]. The United States has adopted a risk-based system. FFIEC, Banlc Secrecy Act I 
Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual ll-27, l-l, K-l, M-l, M-2 (2006) [hereinafter FFIEC 
MANUAL]. 
46. FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3. According to the FA TF, the new focus on risk 
allows financial institution and DNFBP and supervisory authorities to be more efficient and effective in 
their use of resources and minimize burdens on customers, although it does not say exactly how. 
GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH, supra note 45, at 2. During the years when the FATF was 
considering the adoption of a risk based-approach disagreement tended to arise at between those FA TF 
delegates from a law enforcement background and those from a regulatory, particularly bank regulatory 
background, with the latter arguing in favor of a risk-based approach. In general, the banlcing regulators 
were used to dealing with concepts of risk while law enforcement was not. "Supervisors must be 
satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process 
(including Board and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or 
mitigate all material risks ... " BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANK.ING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR 
EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, Principle 7 (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbsl29.pdf. 
47. FATF 40 Reconunendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5. The Methodology goes on 
to provide certain examples of higher risk categories. Methodology, supra note l 0, at Criteria 5.8 and 
5.9. Recommendation 6 singles out a particular category of customers, those individuals who are or 
have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, as well as family members or 
close associates, which are termed "politically-exposed persons." FATF 40 Recommendations, supra 
note 3, at Reconunendation 6. It requires financial institutions and DNFBP to have risk management 
systems to determine if customers are politically-exposed persons and to take reasonable measures to 
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Recommendation 10 reqmres that financial institutions and DNFBP 
maintain customer records, including identification records and transaction 
records sufficient to pem1it reconstruction of individual transactions 
sufficient for evidence in a prosecution, and that these records be 
maintained for at least 5 years and be available for inspection by competent 
authmities49 (Special Recommendation VII provides more detail with 
respect to wire transfers). 50 This, along with Recommendation 5, allows 
investigative and prosecutorial authorities to "follow the money" of 
. . 1 51 cnmma suspects. 
2. Transaction Monitoring and Suspicious Transaction Reporting 
Recommendation 11 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP 
pay special attention to "complex, unusual large transactions, and unusual 
pattems" of transactions with no "apparent economic or visible lawful 
purpose," examine "as far as possible" the background and purpose of such 
transactions, and establish the findings in wiiting. 52 This requirement is 
separate from Recommendation 5's requirement for ongoing customer due 
diligence with respect to "scrutiny of transactions."53 Recmmnendation 13 
requires that a financial institution and DNFBP report promptly to the 
govemmental financial intelligence unit if it "suspects" or has "reasonable 
grounds" to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a ciiminal activity. The 
establish the "source of wealth and source of fimds" and to "conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of 
the business relationship." In other words, if a customer is a politically exposed person the financial 
institt1tion and certain others must always take measures to establish the source of funds. 
Recommendation 6 was added in 2003 to address a perceived public backlash against developed 
cmmtry banks that had laundered the proceeds of developed country dictators. I d. 
48. Under FA TF Recommendation 8, financial instihitions "should pay special attention to any 
·money laundering threats that may arise from new or developing technologies" and must have "policies 
and procedures in place" to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business 
relationships or transactions. Jd. at Recommendation 8. FA TF Recommendation 9 pennits financial 
institt1tions to rely on third parties to unde1iake some due diligence measures in certain cases. Jd. at 
Recommendation 9. 
49. FA TF Recommendation 10 requires financial institutions to keep and maintain client account 
records, and that they "must be sufficient to permit reconstmction of individual transactions (including 
the amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for 
prosecution of criminal activity." !d. at Recommendation 10. 'Competent authorities' refers to all 
administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and 
terrorist financing, including the financial intelligence unit and supervisors. Methodology, supra note 
I 0, at page 62. 
50. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Special Recommendation VII. 
51. The United States has put in place similar rules. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at 21, 118-
22,261-64. 
52. FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 11. 
53. !d. at Recommendation 5. 
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Methodology describes this as filing a susp1c10us transaction rep01i. 54 
Special Recommendation IV further requires financial institutions and 
DNFBP to file reports if they suspect ten-orism financing. 55 It is these 
Recommendations, along with Recommendation 5, that create the system 
requiring financial institution and DNFBP to monitor customer transactions 
based on their profiles and to report to law enforcement those that raise 
suspicion that criminal proceeds or ten-orism financing might be involved. 
Recommendation 15 requires financial institutions to develop internal 
policies, procedures, and controls for anti-money laundering programs, 
including compliance management an-angements, internal h·aining, and 
audit capacities. 56 Recommendation 16 extends most of these requirements 
to the same DNFBP as found in Recommendation 12, although not all. 57 
An essential aspect of this pmi of the preventive measures system 
should be emphasized. Financial institutions and DNFBP must design and 
implement their own systems. 58 While the five-part requirement describes 
54. Jd .at Recommendation 13. 
55. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Special Recommendation IV. 
Recommendation 21 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP pay "special attention" to business 
relationships and transactions with persons from countries that do not or insufficiently apply the FA TF 
Recommendations (although it does not say how this is to differ from non-special (average?) attention). 
FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 21. This Recommendation raises the 
costs of doing business with persons from countries that do not sufficiently apply the Recommendations 
as a whole. This creates a financial incentive for countries to implement the Recommendations, 
especially as detennined by assessment reports. 
56. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 15. 
57. !d. at Recommendation 16. Recommendation 14 protects financial institution and DNFBP 
from any liability for filing suspicious activities reports and prohibits the reporting person from 
revealing that such reports are being made (known as the prohibition against tipping off). U.S. mles 
comply with these requirements, except that DNFBP include casinos only. 31 CFR § 103.18,19 (2006). 
58. See, e.g., FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5 ("Financial 
institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures ... but may determine the extent of such 
measures on a risk sensitive basis .... ") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation 6 (Financial 
systems should "[hjave appropriate risk management systems") (emphasis added); /d. at 
Recommendation 8 ("Financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to address any 
specific risks associated with nonface to face business relationships or transactions.") (emphasis added); 
Jd. at Recommendation 9 ("[a] financial institution should satisfy itself that the third party is regulated 
and supervised for, and has measures in place to comply with CDD requirements in line with 
Recommendations 5 and 10") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation 10 ("[R]ecords must be 
sufficient to pe1mit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of 
currency involved if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.") 
(emphasis added); Jd. at Recommendation 11 ("Financial institutions should pay special attention to all 
complex, unusual large transactions .... The background and purpose of such transactions shoufd. as 
far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help competent 
authorities and auditors.") (emphasis added); !d. at Recommendation l3("If a financial institution 
suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are 
related to te!Torist financing it should be required ... to repmi promptly its suspicions .... ")(emphasis 
added); !d. at Recommendation 15 ("Financial institutions should develop program[]s against money 
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what these systems are supposed to accomplish, it does not provide any 
detail as to how they are supposed to do it. Financial institutions and 
DNFBP are not told how to implement those requirements. An exception to 
this is Recmmnendation 25, which requires that govemment authorities 
establish guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions and 
others subject to preventive measures, in pa1iicular "in detecting and 
reporting suspicious transactions. "59 Both how govemmental agencies 
provide guidelines and feedback, and how the private sector implements its 
preventive measure requirements, are discussed below. 
C. Public Sector Role 
1. Overview 
Recommendations 18, 19, and 26 through 32 (and the relevant 
materials in the accompanying Methodology for assessment of compliance) 
address both the supervisory system to ensure private sector compliance 
with its preventive measures requirements and the criminal investigation 
and prosecution system for state law enforcement authmities. 60 As shall be 
seen, the public sector's role focuses on three basic objectives. The first is 
to ensure the private sector's compliance with their preventive measure 
responsibilities. 61 Essentially, govemmental authmities must supervise and 
regulate financial institutions and DNFBP to ensure compliance. This must 
include both guidance and examination functions, including the potential 
application of sanctions. The second is to ensure that suspicious transaction 
reports lead to the investigation of approp1iate cases of suspected c1ime and 
terrorism.62 Essentially, a financial intelligence unit receives and analyzes 
these reports along with other key infonnation. It then decides which 
should be ftuiher investigated63 and forwards these to the appropriate 
govenm1ent agency (typically the police). They then, sometimes in 
consultation with state prosecutors, decide whether and how to go 
forward. 64 
laundering and terrorist financing ... [including] [t]he development of intemal policies, procedures and 
controls, including appropriate compliance management a1Tangements ... . ")(emphasis added). 
59. I d. at Recommendation 25. 
60. Recommendations 18 and 19 are listed under the preventive measures section of the FATF 
Recommendations, 26 through 32 are under "C. Institutional and other Measures Necessary in systems 
for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Competent authorities, their powers and 
resources." See F ATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3. 
61. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
62. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
63. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text. 
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2. Guidelines, Feedback, and Supervision 
Recommendation 25 requires that government authorities establish 
guidelines and provide feedback to assist financial institutions and DNFBP, 
in particular "in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. "65 The 
Methodology goes ftuiher by stating that authorities should provide a 
description of money laundering and terrorism financing techniques and 
methods and any additional measures to ensure that the systems are 
implemented by financial institutions and DNFBP.66 This includes 
infom1ation on current techniques, methods and trends (typologies), 67 
examples of actual money laundering cases, and case by case feedback, 
including if a suspicious transaction report was found to relate to a 
legitimate transaction. 68 
In order to ensure compliance with the preventive measures, 
Recommendation 23 requires that financial institutions and DNFBP be 
subject to adequate regulation and supervision to ensure implementation of 
the preventive measures, 69 while Recommendations 29 and 17 require that 
supervisors have adequate powers to ensure compliance including the 
imposition of sanctions. 70 
65. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3 at Reconm1endation 25. 
66. Methodology, supra note 10, at criteria 25.1-2. 
67. "The methods used for laundering money and the fmancing of terrorism are in constant 
evolution. As the international financial sector implements the F ATF standards, criminals must find 
alternative channels to launder proceeds of criminal activities and finance illicit activities. The FATF 
identifies new threats and researches money laundering and terrorist financing methods. FATF 
Typologies reports describe and explain the nature of these methods and threats, thus increasing global 
awareness and allowing for earlier detection." FATF, Methods and Trends, available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417 ,en_ 322503 79 _ 32237202 _1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html. 
68. See supra notes 47, 58, and accompanying text. 
69. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 23. Recommendation 24 
extends this requirement to designated non- financial businesses and persons. !d. at Recommendation 
24. 
70. ld. at Recommendations 29, 17. U.S. laws also comply with these requirements. 31 C.F.R. § 
103 (2004), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a, 1.32-37 ( 1948). The U.S. has levied significant fines, as well as other 
supervisory and regulatory orders, against fmancial institutions and casinos. "Since September 11, 
FinCEN has imposed a number of fines on banks for failing to meet its reporting requirements. 
Moreover, those fines have been extraordinarily large. ABN AMRO, a large European bank, has been 
hit with a $30 million fine (and more from state regulators). Western Union has also been hit with a $30 
million fine for its record-keeping failures. And, the Department of Justice has brought criminal 
prosecutions for anti-money-laundering violations, which resulted in a $50 million civil monetary 
penalty against AmSouth and $43 million in combined criminal and civil fines against Riggs Bank, 
which put the bank out of business." David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 136!, 1414-!5 (2007) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to 
War]. 
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The efficacy of these effmis and the resulting techniques that the 
p1ivate sector uses to implement preventive measure requirements are 
discussed below. 
3. Suspicious Transaction Analysis and Refenal for Investigation 
Recmmnendation 26 requires that countries establish a financial 
intelligence unit71 that serves as a national center for the receiving, 
analysis, and dissemination of suspicious transaction reports and other 
information regarding potential money laundering or tenmist financing. It 
further states that the financial intelligence unit should have access, directly 
or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative, and law 
enforcement infonnation that it requires to properly undertake its functions, 
including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports.72 Rec01mnendation 
10 states that competent authorities (including financial intelligence tmits) 
should have access to records kept by financial institutions and DNFBP. 73 
Finally, Recmmnendation 40 states that counhies should ensure that their 
competent authorities provide the widest possible range of intemational co-
operation to their foreign counterparts, including infonnation relating to 
money laundering, provided that controls and safeguards are in place to 
ensure that information exchanged is used only in a manner consistent with 
obligations concerning plivacy and data protection.74 The Methodology 
further states that financial intelligence units should be authorized to allow 
foreign intelligence units to search their own databases, including law 
enforcement databases, subject to confidentiality safeguards limiting the 
71. The line between what some countries fonnally refer to as their financial intelligence unit and 
other law enforcement agencies is often blurry. IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 
56 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemaVpubs/ftlfiulfiu.pdf [hereinafter IMF, FINANCIAL 
INTELLIGENCE UNITS]. This Article refers to the financial intelligence unit using a f1.mctional definition. 
72. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 26. For example, FinCEN has 
access to numerous databases. These include several databases of criminal reports sourced from the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's TECS II system, the FBI's National Criminal Information 
Center, the Drug Enforcement Administration's Narcotics and Dangerous Dmgs Information and NDIC 
Systems, the United States Secret Service database, and tbe United States Postal Inspection Service. It 
also has access to the Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of Specially Designated Nationals, the 
Social Security Administration's Death Master File, and the State Department's list of Designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. It also has access to commercial database services from organizations 
such as Dun & Bradstreet, LEXIS/NEXIS, and credit bureaus as well as commercially available lists of 
"Politically Exposed Persons." FinCEN also maintains its own database of investigations and queries 
conducted through FinCEN's systems. FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS 
TRANSFER REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE BANI( SECRECY ACT 9 (October 2006), available at 
http:/ /www.fincen.gov/news _room/rp/files/CBFTFS _ Complete.pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-
BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS). 
73. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 10. 
74. I d. at Recommendation 40. 
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use of the data. 75 This is the only substantive Recommendation relating to 
fmancial intelligence units (the Methodology adds little).76 
A few other key recommendations relate to the implementation of 
preventive measures. Potentially the most important are 33 and 34. 
Recommendation 33 requires that countries ensure that timely information 
on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons is available and 34 
extends this requirement to "express tmsts" and other tmst-like legal 
relationships.77 These Recmmnendations relate to the customer 
identification requirements of Recommendation 5. However, 
Recommendations 33 and 34 are highly problematic in cormnon law 
countries where information on beneficial ownership or trust relations is 
not kept by government agencies. 78 Another potentially key 
recommendation is Special Recommendation VIII, which states that 
countries "should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to 
entities that can be abused for the fmancing of terrmism." The 
Recommendation goes on to state that "non-profit organisations are 
particularly vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be 
misused ... by ten·orist organisations posing as legitimate entities. "79 
D. Private Sector Successes and Failures 
1. Overview 
There are a number of public policy considerations relating to the 
privatization of preventive measures. The most important is the 
effectiveness of implementation, followed by cost and certain data access 
75. Methodology, supra note 10, at Criterion 40.4.1. 
76. Following the terrorist attacks of September, 2001, staff at the IMF produced the first draft of 
a methodology for assessment of the 40 Recommendations and (then) vm Special Recommendations. 
The draft methodology included a significant number of criteria spelling out in detail the duties of 
financial intelligence units, including most of those described in in/i-a note 153 and accompanying text. 
However, during a meeting in Basel in February, 2002 representatives of the Egmont Group, an 
informal association of financial intelligence units, see http://www.egmontgroup.org/, objected to the 
spelling out in such detail of the purposes and activities of FrUs because of the difficulty of finding 
consensus on such a large amount of detail from such a large group. Nevetiheless, the representatives 
largely concun·ed that the criteria in the methodology described "an effective" financial intelligence 
unit. The author of this Article was the principal author of those criteria and was present dming that 
meeting. The U.S. largely complies with these requirements. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 34, at 226-40. 
77. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendations 33 and 34. 
78. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 226-40. 
79. IX Special Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation VIII. Recorrunendation 18 
forbids the licensing of shell banks, or banks that have no physical presence and that are therefore easy 
to set up and difficult to regulate. F ATF 40 Special Recommendations (2003 ), supra note 3 at 
Recommendation 18. 
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issues. Compliance assessments have generally fom1d that record-keeping 
requirements have been effectively implemented. 80 This is less hue of the 
customer identification81 and profiling requirements, where implementing 
mles have sometimes been found to be inadequate or where effectiveness 
bas been difficult to detennine, especially with respect to beneficial 
ownership. 82 Concerns as to the workability of these requirements can be 
80. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. This is demonstrated by the fact that no FATF papers have 
been commissioned or written concerning failures in the record-keeping requirements. Also, a review of 
several recent assessment reports indicates no problems with recordkeeping. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 126-36; FATF, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AUSTRIA 127-30 (2009), m'ai/ab/e a/ 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/22/50/44146250.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING 
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, AUSTRALIA 80-84 (2005), available a/ http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/60/33/35528955.pdf [hereinafter AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EV ALUAT!ON REPORT]; FATF, 
THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING 
OF TERRORISM, CANADA 149-154 (2008), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/ 
5/3/40323928.pdf [hereinafter CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT: ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, 
UNITED KINGDOM 132-39 (2007), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/55/29/39064399.pdf 
[hereinafter U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT]; FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT: 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, HONG KONG, CHINA 
104-11 (2008), available a/ http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/19/38/41032809.pdf [hereinafter HONG 
KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT]. 
81. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. The overall effectiveness of client identification tends not to be 
addressed in FATF compliance reports (or only briefly with little information), often because the rules 
implementing the FATF Recommendations are themselves inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34 (not discussed at all); AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 80, at 102-103, 105 {not discussed in detail); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 80, at 70 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); CANADA MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 129 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); 
U.K. MUTUAL EvALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 115 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their 
effectiveness); HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note at 96-97 {not discussed 
in detail); see also discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text. Based on the author of this 
Article's considerable personal experience, when rules are adequate reports may fail to address the issue 
because oftbe difficulty in determining effectiveness. 
82. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. The overall effectiveness of client profiling tends not to be 
addressed in FATF compliance reports (or only briefly with little information), often because the rules 
implementing the FATF Recommendations are inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 34 (not discussed at all); AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, 
at 106 (not discussed); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 71 (inadequate 
rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); CANADA MUTUAL Ev ALUATJON REPORT, supra note 80, 
at 130 (inadequate mles obviate discussion oftbeir effectiveness); U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 80, at 116 (inadequate rules obviate discussion of their effectiveness); HONG KONG CHINA 
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 96-97 (not discussed in detail). Based on the author 
of this article's considerable personal experience, when rules are adequate reports may fail to address 
the issue because of the difficulty in determining effectiveness. 
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based both on the effectiveness of the system as designed by the F ATF 
Recommendations83 and on how that system is implemented. 
According to some scholars there is little evidence that preventive 
measures have reduced money laundering.84 This is particularly tme with 
respect to transaction monitoring and suspicious transaction reporting 
requirements, where both scholars and practitioners have raised serious 
doubts as to whether they actually work to help catch money launderers 
and teiTorist financers. 85 For example, in the U.S., suspicious transaction 
repmis have apparently led to very few investigations; in fact, FinCEN, the 
U.S. financial intelligence tmit, does not even repo1i how many are 
reviewed by government authorities. 86 Statistics collected in the course of 
Financial Action Task Force mutual evaluations of other countries also 
suggest that few successful investigations are developed from suspicious 
transaction reports.87 If reporting helps it may only be at the ex post stage, 
when the authorities can use records to follow the money, not at the 
detection or "preventive" stage. There is also a strong indication that many 
financial institutions do not believe that financial intelligence units or other 
governmental authmities make much use of suspicious activity reports, in 
part because the reports are too numerous to be helpful. 88 Perhaps most 
significantly, a common, if more private, refrain by financial intelligence 
unit and financial investigator expe1is at F ATF is that the system of client 
profiling and monitoring of transactions simply does not work to provide a 
83. With respect to client identification and profiling, FATF mutual evaluation reports tend to 
consider both the efficiency of the system as required and overall effectiveness. With respect to 
technical issues in implementation see inji·a note 85 and accompanying text. 
84. Investigations have a failure rate of99.9%. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 
70, at 1413. 
85. FATF mutual evaluation reports usually consider only the efficiency of the system as required 
under the Recommendations and not overall effectiveness at actually preventing money laundering or 
terrorism financing. Rules implementing the FATF Recommendations are themselves often found to be 
inadequate. See, e.g., U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 160; AUSTRIA MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 106; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 
80, at 71; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note80, at 130; U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 80, at I 16; HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 
97. With respect to technical issues in implementation see infi·a notes 239-241 and accompanying text. 
86. Cuellar, Criminal Law, supra note 3 at 323,378. 
87. See, e.g., AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 132; AUSTRALIA 
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at I 12-14; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 80, at 213-14; U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 178; HONG KONG 
CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 96-98. 
88. "Fmstration mounts that ... [the suspicious transaction reports] filed were of no use to 
apathetic or overwhelmed govemment authorities." John Adams, Anti-Money Laundering: Diligence is 
Getting Pretty Pricey, Bank Technology News (August 2007), available at http://www.dominion-
ad visors. com/press/ in- the-news/2 00 7 /anti -money-laundering-diligence-getting-pretty-pricey 
[hereinafter Adams, Diligence is Getting Pretty Pricey]. 
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significant number of effective leads in proceeds of crime or terrorism 
financing investigations. 
In 2001 Professors Ann Seidman, Robert B. Seidman, and Nalin 
Abeysekere outlined a theory of legislative drafting that discussed how 
policy is effectively implemented though a particular law or rule. 89 They 
identify three broad categories that detennine whether a person (actor) 
subject to a legislative mandate will effectively implement that mandate: 
the actor's understanding of the relevant rule (objective knowledge); the 
actor's antiCipation of the implementing agency's behavior (the 
govemment's incentive or disincentive effects as applied to the actor); and 
the non-legal constraints and resources of the actor's own environment.90 
They fmiher divide these three broad categories into seven sub-categories: 
(1) the precise wording of the rule; (2) the actor's opportunity to obey the 
rule (3) the actor's capacity to obey the rule, ( 4) the c01mnunication of the 
rule to the actor, (5) the actor's incentive to obey or disobey the rule, (6) the 
process by which the actor decides whether and how to obey the rule, 
including input, feedback, and decision-making systems by which the actor 
chooses how to behave in the face of the rule; and finally (7) the actor's 
ideology.9I 
One can further consolidate and elucidate these categories so that they 
are clear and easy to apply in the case of preventive measures. First, the 
more clearly stated92 and objective93 a rule is, the easier it is for both the 
89. See generally ANN SEIDMAN, ROBERT B. SEIDMAN & NALIN ABEYSEKERE, LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE (2001) [hereinafter SEIDMAN ET AL. LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING]. 
90. !d. at 94. 
91. Jd. at 95-6. See also Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman, Is Legislation an Unprincipled 
Mess? JTLAM: Drafting Evidence-Based Legislation for Democratic Social Change, 89 B.U.L. REv. 
435,454 (2009) [hereinafter Seidman eta/., Is Legislation an Unprincipled Mess?]. 
92. See REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 1-7 (1954) (introducing 
legal drafting and specifically focusing on wording and achieving substantive clarity as means to 
improving legal instruments, including legislation and constitutions); TOBIAS A. DORSEY, LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTER'S DESK BOOK 169-240 (2006) (describing the importance of writing effectively in legislative 
drafting and emphasizing that "the essence of effective drafting is clear writing"), citied in Seidman et 
al., Is Legislation an Unprinciples Mess?, supra note 91, at n.35. Of course, there are many scholars 
who question whether language can ever be clear. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing 
Structure of Legitimacy in StatutOIJI Interpretation, 108 HA.Rv. L. REv. 593, 602-03 (1995) (discussing 
the postmodem view that there may never be clarity in statutory language). The point I make here is 
that one can be relatively more or less clear, if never absolutely clear. 
93. Meaning a standard relatively less subject to interpretation (as in "clear and objective 
standards" that provide "specific and detailed guidance"), Godji-ey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 
(1980), quoted in CarolS. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355,379-80 (1995), is 
not objective as in revealing a particular truth. See Edward L. Rubin, Social Movements and La11' 
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actor and the enforcing authority to implement. Effective input and 
feedback by the implementing authmity is a pmi of this communication, in 
that it helps the actor to conect her or his understanding of the mle. 
Second, the process by which the actor decides whether and how to obey 
the mle is affected by incentives, including economic or other incentives 
and any sanctions (or benefits) applied by the implementing authority. 
Third, the actor's capacity to obey the mle may be limited, meaning she or 
he may simply not have the means to do so. Finally, the actor may have an 
ideological reason favoring or disfavoring implementation, which would 
affect her or his motivation. 
With respect to the effectiveness of implementation by financial 
institutions and DNFBP of the Financial Action Task Force's preventive 
measures, three effects appear to dominate: (1) the clmity and objectivity of 
the standard as supplemented by feedback from implementing agencies, (2) 
economic incentives plus the effect of sanctions for non-compliance, and 
(3) objective capacity. This Article will now address these three basic 
effects. 
2. Clmity and Objectivity of the Rule 
As noted earlier, compliance assessments have generally found that 
record-keeping requirements have been effectively implemented.94 This 
should not be too surprising in that the mles as w1itten are relatively clear 
and unambiguous. This is far less tme of the customer identification and 
profiling requirements and the monitoring and repmiing requirements. 
While the Recommendations describe in some detail the five required 
components (establish customer identity, create customer profile, compare 
transactions with customer profile, examine those that do not fit, report 
those that are suspicious), neither they nor the Methodology give much 
guidance as to exactly how far, and using what crite1ia, financial 
institutions and others certain should go in doing so.95 In other words, they 
are highly subjective. The Recommendations state that financial institutions 
and DNFBP must take "reasonable measures" to vetify the identity of the 
beneficial owner of an account such that the financial institution or DNFBP 
"is satisfied" that it knows who the beneficial owner is.96 This includes 
taking "reasonable measures" to understand the ownership and control 
Reform: Passing Through the Door: Socia!JV!ol'ement Literature and Legal Scholarship, !50 U. PA. L. 
REV. I, 34-46 (2001) (discussing critical theory and objectivity). 
94. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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structure of the customer.97 "Information" on the purpose and nature of the 
business relationship should be obtained to ensure adequate profiling, as 
well as "where necessary" the source of funds. 98 Recommendation 6 
requires "appropriate" risk management systems to determine whether the 
customer is a politically exposed person and that "reasonable measures" be 
taken to establish the source of wealth and funds. 99 Recommendation 11 
requires that "special attention" be paid to transactions that have no 
"apparent" economic or visible lawful purpose, and that their background 
and purpose be examined "as far as possible." 100 Recommendation 13 
requires the repmiing of transactions that a financial institution or DNFBP 
"suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect" are the proceeds of a 
c1iminal activity or are related to tenorist financing. 101 Finally, 
Recommendation 15 requires "appropriate" compliance management 
102 
anangements. 
The phrases in quotes, including "reasonable measures," "is satisfied" 
"where necessary," "appropriate," "special attention," "apparent," "as far as 
possible," "suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect," are not defined 
in the Recommendations nor the Methodology. They are anything but clear 
and objective, unavoidably giving rise to subjective implementation. 103 For 
example, would a "reasonable measure" to vetifY the identity of the 
beneficial owner be simply asking the client if there was a beneficial owner 
other than the person opening the account, or should a bank hire a private 
investigator? What constitutes "special attention" to transactions which 
have no "apparent" economic or visible lawful purpose? Should a bank 
simply give a once-over review based on the examiner's past experience or 
should it investigate each of the client's activities in detail? 
The use of such highly subjective terms does, however, make clear 
that financial institutions and DNFBP must design as well as implement 
their own systems based on considerable subjective judgment. An 
impmiant aspect of this "design and implement" requirement is the new 
1isk-based option. Because client identification and profiling measmes 
97. !d. 
98. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 5. 
99. !d. at Recommendation 6. 
I 00. !d. at Recommendation II. 
101. !d. at Recommendation 13. 
I 02. !d. at Recmmnendation 15. 
I 03. Not surprisingly the lack of clarity in the rules as transferred to legislation is a major 
complaint of the private sector. KPMG INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY 
2007: HOW BANKS ARE FACING UP TO THE CHALLENGE 7-8 (2007), available at http:// 
us.kpmg.com/microsite/FSLibrary DotCom/docs/ AML2007FULL.pdf [hereinafter KPMG, ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY). 
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may be applied on a risk sensitive basis as is "detennine[d]" by the 
financial institution or DNFBP/04 such persons have even greater 
subjective discretion in designing their systems. According to the FATF, 
such an approach "requires resources and expertise to gather and interpret 
information on risks, both at the country and institutional levels, to develop 
procedures and systems and to train personnel. It further requires that 
sound and -vvell-trained judgment be exercised in the implementation .... It 
will certainly lead to a greater diversity in practice which should lead to 
innovations and improved compliance. However, it may also cause 
uncertainty regarding expectations, difficulty in applying uniform 
regulatOJy treatment, and lack of understanding by customers ... "105 On 
their face these mles add even more subjectivity and discretion. 
There is another problem that is not directly related to the lack of 
clarity and subjective nature of the Recommendations. While the client 
identification and profiling requirements include a risk component, 106 the 
monitming and reporting requirements do not. 
Suspicious transactions will have different degrees of likelihood that 
c1iminal proceeds or tenolism financing are involved. In theory, a 
transaction could be ranked from a near zero risk that it includes crime 
proceeds or finances tenorism, up to a near ce1iainty that it does. However, 
the Recommendations do not state at which point a financial institution or 
DNFBP should report, or if it should even make a notation of estimated 
risk on the suspicious h·ansaction report. This makes a real "risk sensitive" 
system difficult if not impossible to apply. 
Next, suspicious h·ansactions will vary as to the size or amount of 
criminal proceeds or teiTorism financing, from a single pe1my to billions. 
However, the preventive measures standards do not provide guidance as to 
whether financial institutions and DNFBP should consider all transactions 
equally, regardless of the size of the suspected criminal proceeds, or 
whether they should focus on transactions with relatively large amounts of 
suspected criminal proceeds. While it might appear logical for financial 
institutions to apply greater effo1is to detennine the probity of relatively 
larger transactions, there is no guidance to this effect. 
One restriction on the discretion afforded by the Recommendations 
and Methodology could come from the methods, trends, typologies, and 
feedback that govemment authorities are required to provide financial 
institutions and DNFBP. 107 Methods, trends, and typologies are produced 
104. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
105. FATF, GUIDANCE ON Ti-lE RISK-BASED APPROACH, supra note 45, at 2 (emphasis added). 
106. See supra notes 44-4 7 and accompanying text. 
107. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
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and published by the Financial Action Task Force, FATF associate 
members, FATF-style regional bodies, 108 and national authorities, 
especially financial intelligence units. However, such guidance and 
feedback rarely include assistance in interpreting terms or designing 
systems for profiling, monitoring, and reporting. Rather, they nonnally 
only provide examples of activities that heighten the risk that a particular 
client or transaction represents the proceeds of crime or tenorism 
financing. These tend to be limited to basic examples, such as which 
geogTaphical areas include a higher incidence of tenorism (e.g. Pakistan) or 
typical tactics used by launderers (e.g. transfers among different shell 
companies). 109 They do not include examples of effective systems to detect 
them. 
For example, FinCEN, the U.S. financial intelligence unit, provides 
many sanitized examples (meaning that identifying infonnation like actual 
names and dates are deleted) of past cases of laundering and tenorism. 110 It 
also provides what it refers to as "red flags" that indicate a higher risk of 
laundering and tenorism finance, which are also based on prior cases. 111 
Such "red flags" include, for example, "[a] customer uses unusual or 
suspicious identification documents that cannot be readily verified" or 
"[t]he customer's background differs from that which would be expected on 
the basis of his or her business activities. "112 Besides being rather obvious, 
these "red flags" do not tell the financial institution or DNFBP what kind of 
diligence to apply to these transactions or at what point they should report 
them. Oddly, FinCEN does not even make objective infonnation readily 
108. See supra note 67. 
109. See, e.g., FATF-GAFJ, MONEY LAUNDERING METHODS & TRENDS, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en _32250379 _32237277 _l_l_l 
_l_l,OO.html; FATF-GAFI, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES 2003-2004, 19-23, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/dataoecd/191ll/33624379.pdf (discussing Politically Exposes Persons ("PEPs")); FATF-GAFl, 
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON MONEY LAUNDERING TECHNOLOGIES 2001-2002, 12-14, 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi .org/dataoecd/29/35/3403 8006.pdf (discussing corruption and private 
banking). 
II 0. These examples include summaries of Jaw enforcement cases, tips on the preparation and 
filing of suspicious activity reports, issues and guidance for financial institutions on procedural matters, 
topics warranting attention and recent court decisions, an industry forum open to financial institutions to 
outline issues of concern to their community, and a mailbag and feedback section which addresses 
issues raised by the financial institution industry, such as filing of suspicious activity reports and 
identification of suspicious activity categories. See generally U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 34. 
Ill. FFIEC MANUAL, supra note 45, at Appendix F. While this section is explicitly entitled 
"Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 'Red Flags,"' other sections of the Manual include various 
examples of money laundering and terrorism financing techniques. See, e.g., id. at Appendix G. 
ll2. Jd. at F-l. 
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available, such as !mown havens for money laundering or the names of 
senior foreign political figures subject to the heightened due diligence 
mles. 113 
Another serious problem is a lack of feedback on suspicious 
transaction reports actually filed by financial institutions and casinos to 
FinCEN. 114 According to a series of coinfidential interviews the author 
conducted with compliance officers at three U.S. banks, each believed it 
would be vety helpful indeed to !mow if and why particular suspicious 
transaction repmis resulted in a successful investigation. This would pennit 
the bank to improve their monitoring and repmiing systems by allowing 
them to review their systems based on actual successes and failures. 
However, FinCEN does not provide such feedback at all. 115 
FinCEN's methods are by no means unusual. A recent survey of 
Australia, the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and certain other 
O.E.C.D. countries suggests that there is little useful infonnation provided 
by domestic financial intelligence units to financial institutions and 
DNFBP, especially with respect to new money laundering techniques and 
trends within existing techniques. 116 
Without clear instmctions in the Recommendations or Methodology 
on how to design and implement a preventive measures system, and 
without adequate guidance and feedback to supplement those standards, 
financial institutions and DNFBP still face a compliance supervismy 
process along with the threat of sanctions for non-compliance. Because the 
details of individual examinations are confidential, it is difficult to ascertain 
with any certainty how the supervismy process detem1ines compliance. For 
example, FinCEN's published compliance actions 117 reveal very little detail 
as to nahtre of the preventive measures systems reviewed. 118 Nevertheless, 
113. Sorcher, Lost in Implementation, supra note 3, at 415. 
114. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 65-68. Reporting institutions often do 
not know how information reported to FinCEN is used, if at all. Nicole !VI. Healy, Edward J. Krauland, 
Kevin L. Shepherd, Cari Stinebower, Richard L. Fmehauf, William P. Barry, Abraham Wise, Scott 
Nance, & Tessa Capeloto, US. a11d I11ternational Anti-Jv!oney Laundering Developments, 43 lNT'L LAW. 
795, 802 (2009) [hereinafter Healy, U.S. and International Anti-Money Laundering Developments]. 
115. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 65-68. 
116. See Matthew H. Fleming, UK Lm11 Enforcement Agency Use and Ma11agement of SARs: 
Toward Determining the Value of the Regime, 59 (2005), available at http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/ 
downloads/pub! ications/research_ reports/Fleming_ LEA_ Use_ and_ Mgmt_ of_ SARs _J une2005 .pdf 
[hereinafter Fleming, UK Law Enforcement]. 
117. FinCEN, Compliance Actions, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011 ). 
118. "[The regulated industry] has accused FinCEN of assessing the t!nes randomly and 
unpredictably and has sought more guidance from the agency on how it decides to assess fines and why 
it makes them so large." Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1415. 
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a review of these actions clearly shows that breaches identified constitute 
clear failmes in implementing the most basic of system requirements. 119 
Also, in the course of conducting assessments of compliance with the 
FATF Recommendations, this author has reviewed hundreds of 
examination reports of financial institutions by supervisory authorities in 
six different countries, both developed and developing. As with the 
published FinCEN compliance actions, with no exception, the reports 
reveal an attention only to fundamental system requirements. In no 
instances had the supervisor provided any assistance in designing or 
redesigning preventive measures systems beyond reco1m11ending basic 
requirements, or given any attention to the likely overall effectiveness of 
the systems in place. 
With respect to clarity and objectivity of the rule, one would expect 
financial institutions and DNFBP to perfom1 relatively well with respect to 
recordkeeping and less well with respect to client identification, profiling, 
transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction repmiing. As will be 
demonstrated in Part II, this stands in sharp contrast to the duties of the 
private sector in enforcing the income tax laws. There, the rules are very 
clear, highly objective, and, not surprisingly, implemented far more 
effectively. 
3. Economic and Regulatory Incentive Effects 
There are a number of incentive effects that might militate both in 
favor of and against financial institutions and DNFBP seeking to 
implement an effective identification system. This section will begin by 
reviewing the conflicting incentives that arise when a policing function is 
ptivatized as an unfunded mandate. 
P1ivate sector persons may voluntarily assume policing 
responsibilities 120 when crimes directly affecting them are not being 
119. See, e.g., Doha Banlc, New York Branch, Case Number 2009-1 (Dep't of Treasury April 20, 
2009), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/eaffiles/Doha.pdf (wire transfer monitoring did 
not extend to multiple transfers, late filing of suspicious activity reports); NY Branch United Bank for 
Africa, Case Number 2008-3 (Dep't of Treasury April 28, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/eaffiles/UBAAssessment.pdf (no internal controls); El Noa Noa Corporation, Case Number 
2008-2 (Dep't of Treasury April 14, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ 
E1NoaNoa.pdf (no implementation of written antimony laundering control program). 
120. In the Anglo-Saxon world enforcement of the criminal law was almost entirely private up until 
the first half of the nineteenth century, when the state began to take a dominant role in policing, 
investigating, and prosecuting breaches of the criminal law. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 921-24 (2007) [hereinafter Simmons, Private Criminal Justice]. Since the 
American Civil War, however, the reverse, or the privatizing of law enforcement, has proliferated. 
BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT 5-7 (1998) [hereinafter BENSON, TO SERVE AND 
PROTECT). "Privatizing" a public service can mean both the decision to provide a service and the 
administrative action to produce the service. James F. Gilsinan, James Millar, Neil Seitz, James Fisher, 
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adequately addressed by the public sector. This is sometimes referred to as 
"self help."l21 As a general rule, the private, for-profit sector seeks to 
minimize costs as a way of maximizing profits. For this reason, one would 
expect that when a private sector actor chooses to assume the costs of law 
enforcement it would do so only when the benefits to the actor exceed the 
costs. 122 This calculus can be altered if the costs of such patiicipation are 
paid wholly or in part by the public sector. l13 This can be accomplished 
through a general subsidy for carrying out a patiicular police function or 
though a system of bounty-hunting or reward for successfully assisting in 
the investigation or prosecution of a wrongdoer. 124 However, in both cases 
the calculus would be the same. The private sector person will carry out 
such a police function to the extent that total benefits from reducing the 
adverse effects of crime on the ptivate sector person plus any subsidy or 
bounty exceed total costs involved. 
The private sector can also be forced by law to take on the costs of 
private law enforcement with no compensation for doing so. 125 In most 
such cases, such unfunded mandates on the private sector are incentivized 
by applying penalties for failure to discharge adequately the required 
duties. 126 At least at first look, this appears to be the case with all of the 
preventive measures applicable to financial institutions and DNFBP. 
Ellen Harshman, Muhammad Islam & Fred Yeager, The Role of Private Sector Organizations in the 
Control and Policing of Serious Financial Crime and Abuse, 15 J. OF FIN. CRIME Ill, 112 (2008) 
[hereinafter Gilsinan, The Role of Private Sector Organizations]. In this Ariicle "privatized" law 
enforcement services refers to the second meaning only. 
121. One of the most obvious historical examples is the private Pinkerton police force. Elizabeth E. 
Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 357, 364-66 
(2006) [hereinafter Joh, The Forgotte11 Threat]. Even such private policing can bring a public benefit. 
Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation BeilFee/1 Public and Private Policing, in MODERN POLICING, 339, 
404 (Michael Tonry & Norval MmTis eds., 1992), cited in Debra Livingston, Police Discretion cmd the 
Quality af Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the Nell' Polici11g, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 
n.387 (1997). 
122. This presumably would include costs of lobbying, bribing, etc. the public to protect tlie 
interests of the private actors. 
123. Gilsinan eta!. have referred to this as "the enthusiastic intelligence operative." Gilsinan, The 
Role of Private Sector Organizations, supra note 120, at !14-15. 
124. James Fisher, Ellen Harshman, William Gillespie, Henry Ordower, Leland Ware, & Frederick 
Yeager, Privatizing Regulation: Whistle-blowing and Bounzv-Hunting i11 the Financial Services 
Industries, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 117, 142-43 (2000) [hereinafter Fisher, Privatizing Regulation]. 
!25. There is no genera! legal requirement that private actors enforce the laws beyond the crime of 
misprision of a felony, which requires both active concealment and a failure to disclose a crime. 
Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 US. C. § 4: A11 Exploration of the 
Federal Misprision of Felony Statute, 55 ALA. L. REv. 183, 185 (2003 ). 
!26. These are also known as "unfunded private mandates" as opposed to ·'intergovernmental" 
mandates, where a superior level of government requires an inferior level to do something for free. 
Gregory G. Rapawy, Recent Legislation: Federallvfandate Procedures, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 571,572 
( 1999). Unfunded mandates are also known as "regulatory expenditures," in that the regulation creates 
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If the private sector party were to see no direct benefit for its 
contribution to effective law enforcement, other than avoiding penalties for 
non-compliance, the inherent incentive structure in such an anangement 
suggests that the private actor would seek to minimize costs as much as 
possible. 127 Those costs would include those involved in implementing the 
unfunded duties plus any sanctions for non-perfonnance. 128 
To achieve the goal of spending as little as possible on required duties, 
the private party could seek to interpret those duties as nanowly as 
possible, meaning as nanowly as can be gotten away with before the cost 
of sanctions for non-compliance exceeded the savings from not acting. 
Certainly the more clear and objective the p1ivatized enforcement 
requirement, the harder it would be for the private party to interpret "down" 
its duties. 129 However, any ambiguity would suggest that at least some of 
the interaction between private and public sectors involves the fonner 
attempting to restrict duties and the latter seeking to expand them. This 
general incentive stmcture suggests that financial institution and DNFBP 
would tend to minimize effmis to create effective systems. 
There may be incentives working in the opposite direction, however. 
It may be that although they are required to implement preventive systems 
as an unfunded mandate, financial" institutions and DNFBP may have some 
self-interest in implementing those mandates. 
As a general matter, criminal law enforcement involves at least some 
degree of public goods. 130 The benefits accme not only to one or more 
costs on the party mandate to enforce them even if no money is appropriated to pay for those costs. 
Jolm D. Graham, Paul R. Noe & Elizabeth L. Branch, Managing the RegulatOIJ' State, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 953,985 (2006). In the United States, The Unfunded Mandates Refonn Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 
1532 (Supp. 1995) requires both a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and 
benefits of unfunded federal government mandates on state and local governments and on the private 
sector. Enacting unfunded mandates is also known as "cost-shifting." Thomas F. Burke, The Rights 
Revolution Continues: Why Nell' Rights are Born (and Old Rights Rare~v Die), 33 CONN. L. REV. 1259, 
1264 (2001). 
127. With respect to the mandated privatization of financial regulation, Gilsinan et al. have referred 
to the private purveyors of police services as "the gmdging informant." Gilsinan, The Role of Private 
Sectar Organizations, supra note 120, at I 13-14. 
128. There may be some analogous incentive problems in the public sector, in that government 
agencies may tend not to focus their attention on issues or tasks that they believe are not central to their 
main mjssion. See generally lAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT (I 989). 
I 29. At the least the public sector would be expected to provide the private actor with "more 
precise parameters" with respect to the requirement. Gilsinan, The Role of Private Sector 
Organizations, supra note 120, at I 14. 
130. The economist Paul Samuelson originally defined a "public good" (or a collective 
consumption good) as something "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that 
good ... "Paul Samuelson, The Pure The01y of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 
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persons who might suffer from any specific criminal act but to all persons, 
primarily through deterrence. For this reason, the benefits of self-help are 
shared by :fi·ee riders, once again militating against the private sector 
spending any money on a mandate beyond the minimum to avoid 
sanctions.131 However, in many instances there may be an overlap between 
public and p1ivate benefits. 132 While one would expect the private sector to 
try and control free-riders by focusing benefits on themselves, to the extent 
that such self-help did spill over to those not paying for the service, such 
private law enforcement would still qualify as a public good. In such cases, 
however, an obvious detriment would be that the private law enforcement 
would be directed as much as possible towards private rather than public 
benefits, and would presumably be limited by such motivation. 133 
Financial institutions and DNFBP may voluntarily incur the costs of 
preventive measures for four basic reasons: to avoid concentration risk, 
reputational risk, operational risk, and legal or regulatory risk. In banking, 
concentration risk is defined as excessive exposure to single borrowers or 
dependence on single depositors. 134 It is better to spread the risk of default 
among a group of unconnected borrowers than to concentrate the risk in 
one; it is better to spread the risk of withdrawal of debt capital among a 
group of depositors than to concentrate it in one. Concentration risk also 
exists in both insurance and secmities sectors for analogous reasons. 135 A 
key benefit of the client identification requirement could be to help 
financial institutions and DNFBP reduce this risk. The extent to which a 
387, 387 (1954). "Which all enjoy in common" means that no one can (effectively) be excluded from 
the benefit. Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 487, 492-93 (1994). The economist Dennis Mueller describes law enforcement as a "pure" 
public good. DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, 10-1 I (2003). However, some commentators have 
noted that selective enforcement, notably when racially based, is not a public good with respect to those 
who are victims of that enforcement. Paul Butler, Stan· Is to Clinton As Regular Prosecutors Are to 
Blacks, 40 B.C. L. REv 705, 711 (1999). 
131. In a group that provides itself with a public good, a "free rider" is one who contributes little or 
nothinng to the cost of the good while enjoying its benefits as fully as any other member of the group. 
The free rider problem acts as a disincentive for groups voluntarily to provide public goods unless there 
is some way to punish or otherwise control free-ridership. Oliver Kim & Mark Walker, The Free Rider 
Problem: Experimental Evidence, 43 PUBLIC CHOICE 3, 3 (1984). 
132. Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 121, at 375-83. 
!33. Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 120, at 925. 
!34. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE FOR BAl'H(S 
(:2001), at paragraphs 14-15, available at http://www.bis.org/publfbcbs85.pdf [hereinafter BASEL 
COMI'vl., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE]. 
135. International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Glossary, http://www.iaisweb.org/ 
index.cfm?pageiD=47&vSearchLetter=c## (defining "concentration risk"). It is far riskier ro have a 
single insured than to spread the risk among many insured. FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION, 
GUIDANCE NOTES CONCENTRATION RISK 13 (2008), available at http://www.fsc.gi/download 
/adobelbanlcing/noteconcrislc.pdf. 
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party would spend money to identifY clients, including beneficial owners 
and controllers of those clients, would be based on a balance of costs to 
benefits of avoiding such concentration 1isk. While neither is immediately 
obvious, at least some incentive would exist for at least ceJiain types of 
financial institutions to implement this requirement. 
The next form of 1isk is reputational risk. Reputational risk is lisle 
caused by events adversely affecting the reputation of an enterprise, 
pmiicularly a financial institution. 136 Banking regulators have long 
hypothesized that known or assumed use of banks by criminals could result 
in adverse consequences as customers and investors react by shmming the 
institution. Reputational risk also faces other persons, financial and 
nonfinancial. 137 Although discussing sanctions against Iran rather than 
money laundeling and terrorism financing per se, Stuart Levey, the Under 
Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence under President Bush 
and now President Obama, suggested that "financial institutions want to 
identifY and avoid dangerous or risky customers who could harm their 
reputations and business." 138 Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel 
Glaser fmiher noted that "rather than comply with just the letter of the law, 
we have seen many in the banking industry voluntarily go beyond their 
legal requirements because they do not want to handle illicit business."139 
Therefore, implementation of anti-money laundering and terrorism 
financing standards by banks could have direct financial benefits by 
avoiding such reputational risks. 
However, actually demonstrating such reputational risk has proven 
difficult. Preliminary studies by Professors Michael Levi and Peter Reuter 
of stock price fluctuations following news stolies on the use of banks by 
money launderers show no change in stock p1ice from those stmies. 140 
While additional research is needed, there is doubt that financial 
institutions and DNFBP would weigh heavily concems over reputational 
risk. 
136. "Reputational risk is defined as the potential that adverse publicity regarding a bank's business 
practices and associations, whether accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in the integrity of the 
institution." BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. I I. The loss of high 
quality borrowers reduces profitable loans and increases the risk of the overall Joan portfolio. 
Depositors may also withdraw their funds, thereby reducing an inexpensive source of funding for the 
banlc SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at II-5. 
137. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNJT, REPUTATION: RISK OF RISKS 2 (2005) (arguing that 
maintaining a good reputation is the most important and difficult task facing senior risk managers). 
138. Quoted in Orde F. Kittrie, NeH' Sanctions for a New Centwy: Treasury's Innovative Use of 
Financial Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 789,816-17 (2009). 
139. Jd. 
140. Michael Levi, Lecture to International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (2003). 
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There is a second issue related to reputational risk: the concern that 
the profiling, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting requirements 
as outlined in the FA TF Recommendations may not be effective even if 
properly implemented. 141 If they were not, there would be little reputational 
risk benefit to spending money to implement them. And, as discussed 
earlier, there is strong indication that many fmancial institutions do not 
believe that financial intelligence units or other governmental authorities 
make much use of suspicious activity reports. 142 
While there is speculation as to the effects of reputational risk in 
incentivizing fmancial institutions to implement their preventive measures 
responsibilities, there may also be significant disincentives. Financial 
institutions may see a benefit in being known to be lax in implementing 
anti-money laundering duties in that they may attract criminal clients who 
wish to avoid being caught. 143 Much of the current stmggle by developed 
countries to eliminate bank secrecy in offshore financial centers has 
focused on this perceived benefit to financial institutions that offer 
locations to hide c1iminal proceeds, such as in tax evasion. 144 It is by no 
means certain which incentive, the downside risk of a bad reputation or the 
upside risk of a bad reputation, is stronger. 
The next important form of risk is operational risk, which is defined as 
the potential for loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems, or external events. 145 Clearly, at least within the 
standard cost-benefit analytical framework, implementing those aspects of 
preventive measures that assist in uncovering fi·aud would be in the best 
interests of the private party. Unfortunately little publicly available 
information exists on how financial institutions and DNFBP seek to 
prevent financial fraud, an issue that is not addressed in anti-money 
laundering evaluations. A major reason for the absence of such information 
is concern by private parties over protecting propriety systems and concern 
over competition. 146 However, insight into anti-fiaud client identification 
141. This issue is discussed inji·a in Pati III. 
142. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
143. This argument applies only to money laundering and not terrorism financing, where adverse 
reputation is likely to be far greater than any possible financial benefits from having ten·orists as clients. 
But that's just a guess. 
144. See Gordon, 011 the Use a11d Abuse of Standards for Law, supra note 15, at 515-18, 563-64; 
see also Linnley Browning, Swiss Banker Blows Whistle on Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 
2010, at B1 (describing political fallout over the use by U.S. citizens of Swiss banks to engage in tax 
evasion). 
145. BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. 12. 
146. This absence of information is similar to problems in identifying information on how the 
private sector implements preventive measures. See inji-a notes 195-202 and accompanying text. 
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and account monitoring can be gained from examining systems provided 
by third party services to financial institutions. One of the largest advertises 
a "Dynamic Multidimensional Risk-Weighted Suspicious Activities 
Detector to thoroughly monitor all transactions and quickly detect 
fi·audulent activities with the utmost accuracy." 147 According to 
promotional materials, the anti-fi·aud system is capable of sharing the same 
server and database with its anti-money laundering system, but is separate 
and different. 148 
That being noted, fraud committed against a financial institution and 
money laundering and tenorism financing implemented by a financial 
institution are quite different. In the first instance the financial institution is 
the victim; in the second, the financial institution is the medium through 
which the crime is perpetrated. 149 The vast majority of criminal proceeds do 
not involve fraud against banks. 150 While there are many possible origins of 
tenorism financing, bank fraud is only one of them and is unlikely to be a 
significant source. 151 For that reason, one would expect financial 
institutions and DNFBP to focus not on money laundering or tenorism 
financing risks, but on those that directly adversely affect them, lilce 
fi·aud. 152 A key aspect of any anti-fraud program found in a preventive 
measure is the identification and profiling of potential clients and 
employees. Among the most common fom1 of customer fraud against 
147. This includes check fraud, check kiting, ATM fraud, wire transfer fraud, credit card fraud, 
debit card fraud, stored valued card fraud, commercial loan fraud, consumer loan fraud, mortgage Joan 
fraud, online banking fraud, point of sales fraud, trading fraud, insurance fraud, identity fraud, 
employee fraud, and vendor fraud. See generally Guardian Officer, GLOBAL V!SJON SYSTEMS, 
http://www.gv-systems.com/. According to a sales representative, the algorithms for fraud detection and 
money laundering/terrorism financing detection are "significantly different." Telephone interview with 
John Smith, Cleveland, OH (Feb. 20, 201 0). 
148. !d. 
149. IMF, FJNANCJAL SYSTEM ABUSE, FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERJNG-
BACKGROUND PAPER 40 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/ml/2001/eng/021201.pdf 
[hereinafter IMF, MONEY LAUNDERING BACKGROUND PAPER]. 
150. PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY 
LAUNDERJNG 22 (2004) [hereinafter REUTER & TRUMAN, THE FIGHT]. 
151. See COUNTERJNG THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 91-206 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Sue E. 
Eckert eds., 2008). 
!52. "Banks are called upon to identify 'proceeds of crime' when all they can concretely observe 
are account transactions. The issue then for them is to develop criteria capable of identifying deviant 
dealings .... More sophisticated software provides detailed background information on clients and 
account movements. These instmments have also set the criteria for defirring undesirable clients or 
atypical financial operations. The problem is that you have to be sure to target what you want to obtain, 
and adjust the parameters accordingly." Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, Thierry Godefroy, & Pierre 
Lascoumes, Sentinels in the Banking Jnduslly: Private Actors and the Fight against 111oney Laundering 
in France, 48 BRJTJSH J. CRJM. 3, 6 (2008). 
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banks are creditor fraud and wire and check fraud. 153 Simple background 
checks could identifY persons known to have engaged in such activity. In 
addition to identifying known fraudsters, financial institutions may be able 
to monitor types of customers and transactions to uncover known 
fraudulent patterns. For example, one recent creditor fraud involved people 
posing as wealthy dentists who took out loans to purchase speed boats. The 
fraudsters forged various documents including titles to non-existent boats, 
which they used for secmity to obtain the loans. Once this scheme was 
uncovered in one of the bank's branches the bank was able to uncover 
similar schemes in other branches. 154 The bank had every incentive to 
uncover such frauds against the banlc These incentives do not, however, 
extend to possible money laundering or tenorism financing. 
Fraud detection can be assisted by sharing doubts about client bona 
fides with financial intelligence units. Their access to extensive databases 
including police records, immigration and customs records, tax records, 
and supervismy findings 155 make them particularly effective at uncovering 
fraud patterns among large numbers of financial transactions among 
different financial institutions. As a result, some units, including FinCEN, 
are tasked not only with anti-money laundering and tenorism financing 
duties but also with preventing fraud against financial institutions. The 
difference between repmiing possible fraud and possible money laundering 
or tenorism financing is demonstrated by examining the types of reporis 
filed to financial intelligence units. For example, in the United States, a 
significant percentage of suspicious transaction repmis filed with FinCEN 
are not concerned with money laundering or tenorism financing but with 
possible fraud, and are identified as such on the report. 156 
While additional research needs to be undertaken there does appear to 
be some significant anti-fraud benefit to financial institutions and DNFBP 
in client identification and client profiling. There may also be some benefit 
to monitoring transactions to see if they fit any lmown pattems indicating 
fraud, and to report those to financial intelligence units. However, this 
!53. [MF, MONEY LAUNDERING BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 149, at 40. While there is far less 
information with respect to other types of financial institutions, preventive measures mles and financial 
intelligence units have also assisted in uncovering insurance and securities fraud, including insider 
trading and market manipulation. See FinCEN, Banlc Secrecy Act Records Lead to Funds for 
Restitution in Insurance Fraud, available at http://www.fincen.gov/law_enforcement/ss/html/014.html; 
see also FA TF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Securities Sector 48- 53 (2009), 
amilable at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/32/31/43948586.pdf. 
154. Confidential interview with banlc compliance officer in Cleveland, OF-I (Apr. 12, 2009). 
155. l!v!F, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 58. 
156. Of the reports filed by depositoty institutions nearly 400,000 were for money laundering and 
terrDiism financing, while around 300,000 related to financial institution fraud. FinCEN SAR Reviews, 
supra note 19, at 4. 
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would not usually extend to client identification or transaction monitoring 
to detect money laundering or terrorism financing. 
The last possible risk to be avoided, legal or regulatory risk, arises 
from the possibility that financial institutions and DNFBP may suffer 
enforcement actions such as fines and criminal liabilities for breaching 
anti-money laundering or terrorism financing laws or regulations. 157 
However, these are risks for failure to implement burdens imposed by the 
state for law enforcement purposes, not imposed to benefit the financial 
institution. 158 There would be direct benefits to financial institutions and 
DNFBP if they paid fewer fines, but this would have to be balanced against 
the costs of implementing preventive measures, including indirect costs. 
However, the application of sanctions against customers creates a 
strong disincentive to repmi possible laundering. As noted, a principal 
public benefit of anti-money laundering rules is that they ailow the 
confiscation of criminal proceeds. 159 If such proceeds are on deposit or 
otherwise loaned to or invested in a financial institution or DNFBP, the 
confiscation of those proceeds would actually injure that enterprise by 
depriving it of capital. This could be a significant indirect cost. The larger 
the magnitude of the proceeds, the greater would be the injury to the 
enterprise. Given this potentially significant incentive, a purely profit-
maximizing financial institution or DNFBP would seek to follow their 
preventive measures obligations only as far as to avoid sanctions for non-
compliance, but would stop short of the point where they detected and 
repmied actual money laundering, at least with respect to criminal proceeds 
that form part of the enterprise's capital base. 
On balance, there is strong suggestion that financial institutions and 
DNFBP will see risk-reduction benefits from implementing customer 
identification and profiling rules and some from fraud-related transaction 
monitming and reporting. However, there appears to be no obvious net 
self-benefit for anti-money laundering transaction monitoring or reporting. 
Given cost considerations, theory would suggest that private actors would 
keep costs down and benefits up by concentrating on those aspects that 
benefit primarily fraud efforts rather than anti-money launde1ing and 
teno1ism fmancing efforts. 
There are significant costs associated with unfunded mandates of anti-
money laundering and terrorism financing preventive measures, many of 
which also go to the question of capacity to implement such measures. 
157. BASEL COMM., CUSTOMER DUE DILIGENCE, supra note 134, at para. 13. 
158. Richard Gordon, Anti-money-laundering Policies: Selected Legal, Political, and Economic 
issues, I CURRENT DEV. IN MONETARY & FIN. L. 405, 407 (1999). 
159. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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Exactly how much is difficult to quantify. 160 At least with respect to banks, 
transaction monitoring appears to be the greatest area of expenditure. 161 
Given that transaction monitoring appears to provide little direct benefit to 
the financial institution itself (that is, compared to customer identification 
and profiling, which may help prevent fraud), this does not bode well for 
implementation. 
In an increasing number of instances, financial institutions outsource 
at least some preventive measure duties, particularly review of client names 
for profiling purposes, transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction 
identification, resulting in what one commentator has referred to as a 
"cottage industry of consultants." 162 Such outsourcing can have advantages, 
such as reducing costs through economies of scale and improving quality 
through competition. 163 However, smaller institutions may be buying 
scaled-down "anti-money laundering lite" software, 164 which may not be a 
good sign with respect to effective implementation. At any rate, 
implementation costs certainly must have a negative effect on 
implementation when placed into the cost/benefit considerations of 
financial institutions and DNFBP. 
That being said, unfunded mandates do have the benefit of shifting 
costs from the public to the private sector. This can have some benefits, as 
well as some potential downsides that will be discussed at greater length 
below. 165 
As noted earlier, there are significant potential regulatmy incentives to 
compliance. 166 However, these incentives, based on fines and other fonns 
of compliance action, have been applied to failures to implement basic 
requirements (such as no customer identification system, no profiling 
system, no transaction monitoring). 167 None appears to have been based on 
a results-focused failure of the system. It is therefore not obvious how these 
160. Various attempts have been made, however. According to some estimates U.S. banks spent 
about $125 million both in 2003 and 2004 to comply. High-end estimates have placed the total costs of 
compliance at $7 billion in 2003. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1413. 
Presumably these costs have increased. See also Sorcher, Lost In Implementation, supra note 3, at 396 
(noting that banks have significantly increased their spending on AMLICFT procedures). 
161. K.PMG, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY, supra note 103, at 8. 
162. Zaring & Baylis, Bureaucracy to War, supra note 70, at 1413. 
163. Because the purveyors of private services must persuade their customers to purchase from 
them they have an incentive to offer a better price/quality mix than others BENSON, To SERVE AND 
PROTECT, supra note 120, at 27. This suggests greater risk taking and perhaps innovation as well as 
greater quality control and lower costs of through greater efficiencies. !d. 
164. See Adams, Diligence is Getting Pretty Pricey, supra note 88. 
165. See infi·a notes 189-194 and accompanying text. 
166. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
167. !d. 
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would incentivize financial institutions to implement effective preventive 
measures. As a result, with unclear and subjective written requirements, 
often unhelpful guidance and feedback, and a lack of clear incentives for 
effectiveness, one would expect that financial institutions and DNFBP 
would not to do a pmiicularly good job in implementing preventive 
measures. As will be discussed in Part II, this is very different from how 
the private sector implements its tax administration duties, where 
requirements are not only clearly stated but where incentives for 
effectiveness are quite clear. 
As noted earlier, neither compliance reports nor sanctions rep01ied by 
supervisory authorities discuss in any detail the design of compliance 
systems. 168 Financial institutions and DNFBP also do not publicize exactly 
how they implement these requirements. 169 However, some commentators 
have provided a list of actions that private firms could take to implement 
their preventive measures duties in the most effective mam1er possible. 170 
This "wish list" is not a description of what finns actually implement-
only what they could implement assuming that cost was no object. Among 
b . l"nk 1 . 171 t ese lS 1 r ana YS!S. 
Linlc analysis is a technique used to find associations within data that 
might have relevance to the particular research question. 172 Link analysis 
explores associations within collections of data. 173 Increasing the number of 
168. !d. 
169. An important barrier to learning more about how firms actually implement their preventive 
measures requirements is a concern over protecting proprietary infonnation in the context of 
competitive concerns. Confidential interviews conducted with compliance officers at numerous 
financial institutions in the United States, Hong Kong, The British Virgin Islands, and the Philippines 
over the past five years. See also PricewaterhouseCoopers, Anti-Money Laundering ("AML") and A.nti-
TetTorist Financing ("ATF"): Case Study, available at http://www.pwt.com/lulen/anti-money-
laundering/case.jhtml (providing almost no detail on preventive measures system recommended by 
outside consultant). 
170. G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan, Subhrangshu Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat 
Money Laundering, Part 1, DM Review Special Report, October 2007, available at 
http://www .infomlation-management.com/specialreports/20071 002/1 093412-l.html [hereinafter 
Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your Way Part 1]; G. S. Vidyashankar, Rajesh Natarajan, Subhrangshu 
Sanyal, Mine Your Way to Combat Money Laundering, Part 2, DM Review Special Report, October 
2007, available at http://www.infonnation-management.com/specialreports/20071 00911 093416-l.html 
[hereinafter Vidyashankar eta/., Mine Your Way Part 2]. 
171. Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your Way Part 1, supra note 170; Vidyashankar et a/., Mine Your 
Way Part 2, supra note 170. 
172. Cuellar, Criminal Law, supra note 3, at 368. 
173. FINCEN, FEASIBILITY OF A CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER REPORTING 
SYSTEM UNDER THE BANK SECRECY ACT 10 (October 2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/rp/files/CBFTFS _Complete. pdf [hereinafter FINCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC 
FUNDs]; see also Cuellar, supra note 3, at 368. Much of the information in the following two 
paragraphs has been provided by Boudewijn Verhelst. Verhelst e-mail, supm note 20. 
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data sets available increases the number and types of links that can be 
identified. 
There are a number of different types of data set that could be helpful 
in money laundering or terrorism financing linlc analysis. First, personal 
and financial data (including personal and businesses names, addresses, 
phone numbers, names of beneficial owners and controllers, bank accounts, 
deposits, funds transfers) would linlc people and businesses through their 
financial transactions. For example, this can establish that person A has a 
relationship with company B and person C. 
Next, descriptive links can be established with data bases that describe 
the type of business activities nonnally conducted by the persons within the 
linlc. Such data includes customer identification/profiles and other 
infonnation such as that which is found in business directories like Dunn 
and Bradstreet. Links to data that include money laundering or terrorism 
financing indictors, such as law enforcement data, case files, or suspicious 
transaction repmis, can also be made. 
Once such descriptive links are established, further analysis can 
examine whether a transaction between identified persons looks unusual or 
suspicious. For example, if person A has a criminal record or has made past 
suspicious transactions, payments to company B or C could raise suspicion 
that they constitute criminal proceeds or laundeting. This suspicion could 
be raised further if person A owns or controls company B and company B 
itself has no known business. If C has a record as a tenorist or tenorist 
organization, a suspicion might be raised that the payments were to finance 
terrorism. Obviously, the greater the amount of relevant data and data 
types, the more extensive will be the link analysis. However, financial 
institutions and DNFBP are restticted in their access to some useful data 
sets, an issue that will be discussed below. As will be seen in Pmi II, link 
analysis is used with great effectiveness by the public sector in tax 
administration. 
Such use of descriptive links and analysis is also desctibed as data 
mining and the use of algorithms. 174 Such algorithms can be based on 
typical laundeting typologies or "red flag" indicators provided by 
supervisory authorities and the Financial Action Task Force. However, as 
will be discussed below, such algorithms appear to be based on 
idiosyncratic judgment rather than empitically sustainable classifications. 175 
Empirically derived algorithms are based on regression analysis or 
discriminant function analysis. Regression analysis is a technique for 
174. Vidyashankar eta!., Mine Your Way Pmt 2, supra note 170. 
175. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 92-101 (2003). 
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discovering the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. It explains how the value of the dependent variable 
changes when one of the independent variables is changed. This change in 
the dependent variable can also be reflected in a probability distribution. 
Typically, one begins with a hypothesis that the presence and magnitude or 
a particular factor (the independent vmiable) is a predictor of something 
(the dependent variable). One then tests the hypothesis using factual data 
and statistical analysis. 176 For example, a dependent variable could be "the 
likelihood that money launde1ing or teiTorism financing is involved in a 
particular transaction." The independent variables could then be some 
quantifiable aspect of the customer or transaction, say, one of the factors 
found in money laundering or tenorism financing typologies or in the list 
of "red flags." A statistical analysis would then show if the hypolhesis is 
conect and indicate the magnih1de of relationship between the presence of 
a "red flag" and the likelihood that there was money laundering or tenorism 
finance. Multiple independent variables can be statistically combined in 
non-linear regression analysis to create multi-variable probabilities. 
Another way of determining the relationship between a dependent and 
independent vmiables is discriminant function analysis. Here, however, the 
analysis detennines which variables discriminate between two or more 
naturally occurring groups. It also uses a statistical analysis based on 
empirical data. 177 For example, the group could be "those who launder 
money or finance tenorism," while the variables could be the same 
typology factors or red flags in the previous example. Multiple variables 
can be employed and predictor variables can be expressed in magnitudes. 
Obviously these two analytical techniques would be supe1ior to 
assessments made on human hunches or "idiosyncratic assessments" that 
have no proven statistical accuracy .178 As will be seen in Part II, link 
disc1iminant function analysis is used with great effectiveness by at least 
some tax administrations. 
Given that typologies and red flags that supervisory authorities and 
others provide do not appear to be scientifically derived, it seems unlikely 
that private firms, which are primm·ily concemed about controlling 
regulatmy/legal risk, would themselves use regression analysis. In addition, 
176. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis, in CHICAGO LECTURES 
lN LAW & ECONOMICS (Eric Posner ed., 2000), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/ 
20.Sykes_.Regression.pdf (describing linear and non-linear regression analysis). 
177. See generalZv John Poulsen & Aaron French, Discriminant Function Analysis (2003), 
available at http://userwww .sfsu.edu/-efc/classes/biol71 0/discrim/discrim. pdf (describing discriminant 
function analysis). 
178. SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92. 
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private sector entttles lack access to impmiant data sets, such as 
confidential data from other financial institutions and DNFBP and private 
or classified government data (discussed below in Section 4). Also, 
managing large sets of data is simply difficult to do. 179 
As noted above at least some financial institutions contract out some 
of their customer identification and client monitoring programs to third 
party service providers. 180 A review of some of their programs provides 
some insight into services offered. For example, some finns assist in 
customer identification and profiling by providing a risk screening service 
to check individual or entity names against a comprehensive data set. 181 
Finns can also supply transaction monitoring services. One finn "monitors 
and detects" suspicious transactions "across all business lines" using na 
fully integrated dynamic and adaptive multidimensional intelligent engine 
[which] detects suspicious activities" using "risk modeling" and "risk-based 
algorithmsn to "analyze and investigate suspicious activities effectively and 
efficiently." 182 But as contractors to those primarily responsible for 
implementing preventive measures, there is little reason to believe that such 
third party provider firms would be motivated to provide scientifically-
based algmitluns based on regression or discriminant function analysis. 
This would only raise costs without providing a service that would further 
reduce regulatory or legal risk. 
Inespective of what the best firms offer, only some financial 
institutions and perhaps DNFBP use such services, and some contract for 
"lite" versions. 183 Exactly why some financial instihttions and DNFBP use 
contractors is not entirely clear. For some firms it could be a fom1 of 
regulatmy/legal risk "insurance"; as long as a well-regarded third party 
vendor is a contractor it is likely that supervisors will not sanction finns for 
1. 184 non-camp ranee. 
Ptivate sector entities appear to file far too many suspicious 
transaction reports, providing a huge flow of false positives. If a financial 
institution is usually sanctioned for failure to report suspicious transactions 
(false negatives) and not for reporting too many that do not tum out to be 
suspicious (false positives), there will be an incentive for financial 
179. Vidyashankar eta!., Mille Your Way Part 2, supra note 170 ("Analysis of such huge volumes 
imposes a huge computational burden .... "). 
180. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., World-Check Online, http://v;'WW.world-check.com/online/ (last visited Apr. 6, 
2011). 
182. American Bankers Association, PATRlOT OFFICER GlobalVision Systems, Inc., 
http://www.aba.com/CAB/cab_patriotofficer.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 20 ll ). 
183. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
184. Confidential interviews with compliance officers at financial institutions, supra note 154. 
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institutions and DNFBP to apply too little scmtiny and to over-report. 185 
Cun-ently, in many key jurisdictions, there have been considerable 
increases in suspicious transaction rep01iing. 186 Because so few of these 
reports result in actual prosecutions, the result has often been a general 
flooding of financial intelligence units with essentially "defensive" 
suspicious transaction reports. 187 This can generate infonnation overload 
and generally clog the c1iminal investigations system with too many false 
positives. 188 
There are a few possible other good and bad negative effects. Some 
scholars have argued that the p1ivate sector is more likely to act self-
interestedly than the public sector, and if so, the p1ivate sector may be more 
likely to commit to a higher level of unethical acts. 189 One type of unethical 
act could be racial or other invalid profiling. While profiling based on 
purely statistical analysis of empirical data would be helpful in determining 
which cus1omers and transactions are more likely to be involved in criminal 
activity, profiling based on even inf01med guesswork is far more li..lzely to 
result in unfairness. 190 Given that all typologies reports, red flags, and other 
185. See generally Elod Takats, A The01y of 'Oying Wolf': The Economics of Money Laundering 
Enforcement 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 07/81, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=979035 (laying out a theoretical argument for increasing filings of 
defense suspicious activity reports by reporting institutions). Flooding financial intelligence units with 
too many repmis could also help bury those that are actually useful, benefiting reverse reputational risk 
and protecting client assets from seizure. 
186. This conclusion is supported by specific studies of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
See Cuellar, supra note 3, at 396 (describing increases in SARing in the United States); STEPHEN 
LANDER, SERIOUS ORGANISED CRJMES AGENCY, 13 (2006), available at http://v-'WW.soca.gov.uk/ 
downloads/SOCAtheSARsReveiw_Fina;_Web.pdf; Michael Levi & Peter Reuter, Maney Laundering, 
34 CRIME & JUST. 289,313 (2006). 
187. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. ("There is no indication that FinCEN ... knows how to 
manage all of these reports. In fact, the former director of FinCEN complained in 2004 that too many of 
these SARs were being filed by banks. The haphazard nature of the fines that FinCEN has imposed has 
Jed some observers to question1whether the agency has a policy in place to sort through each of the 
reports."); Zaring & Baylis, supra note 70, at 1415 (citations omitted). According to one source, a 
compliance officer in French financial institution noted that if "[y]ou want to stay out of trouble? Then 
file a report." Gilles Favarel-Ganignes, Thierry Godefroy, & Pierre Lascoumes, Sentinels in the 
Banking Industry, Private Actors and the Fight against Money Laundering in France, 48 BRJT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY I, 11 (2008) [hereinafter Favarel-Garrignes el a/., Private Actors]. 
188. LANDER, supra note 186; Levi & Reuter, supra note 186, at 313; Fleming, UK Law 
Enforcement, supra note 116, at 10, 35-6; REUTER & TRUMAN, THE FIGHT, supra note 150, at 101-2. 
189. This is not to suggest that public sector employees are always more ethical, only that they tend 
to be more so than the private sector. See Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, supra note 120, at 978-
79. 
190. SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92-101. Even those who strongly oppose racial profiling for 
national secmity purposes do so in part because there is no empirical or statistical basis for the 
profiling. See, e.g., Yevgenia S. Kleiner, Racial Profiling in the Name ofNatiana/ Security: Protecting 
Minority Travelers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 103, 138-40 
(2010). 
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guidance is based on informed guesswork one can reasonably speculate 
that financial institutions and DNFBP are using unscientific profiling to 
target certain categories of client to avoid the application of sanctions. If 
the adversely affected clients provide relatively small profits to the 
financial institutions or DNFBP the likelihood that they would simply be 
dropped as a client increases dramatically. This may result in reduced 
access to the financial system by those clients. 191 
One area where there is some evidence that this is happening is with 
charities. Special Recommendation VIII suggests that some charities 
appeared to be involved in terrorism-financing transactions. This was 
emphasized repeatedly in material that could be referenced by financial 
institutions, their supervisors, and law enforcement, including F ATF 
reports and guidance issues by national regulators. 192 There is no reason to 
believe that supervisors believe that all charities are somehow tainted. But 
if regulated financial institutions and Dl\fFBP believe that having fewer 
charity clients will result in less of a chance that sanctions will be applied 
to them, fmancial instih1tions and DNFBP may be less likely to accept 
them as clients, particularly if they are low-profit clients. Although this 
would not be the intent of supervisors, this would reduce charities' access 
to the fonnal financial system. There is some evidence that this is in fact 
happening. 193 There may be other terrorism-related profiling problems 
based on type of name (for example, Muslim) or location (say, the Middle 
East). 
Next, preventive measures duties must be financed by either 
increasing p1ices the institutions charge clients, reducing net profits, or 
(most probably) a mix of the two. Higher financial instih1tion p1ices can 
have significant and adverse public policy effects, such as decreasing 
access to financial services by low income clients. 194 
191. For example, some anecdotal evidence suggests financial institutions are accepting fewer 
money service businesses as clients; because they cater primarily to the poor this can have an adverse 
effect on financial services among poorer people. Confidential Interview with bank compliance officer 
in Cleveland, supra note 154. 
192. Gordon, Tiysts or Terrorists, supra note 4, at 718-19. 
193. See generally Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of 
Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global 
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341 (2004) (discussing extensively the liabilities imposed by 
the U.S. on charitable donations by anti-terrorism financing laws). 
194. JENNIFER IS ERN & DAVID PORTEOUS, AML/CFT REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL 
SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT SERVE LOW INCOME PEOPLE 9-16 (2005) (discussing how increased costs 
due to implementation of AMLICFT regulations may reduce the supply of affordable financial services 
to low-income persons). 
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4. Objective Capacity 
The issue addressed in this section is the private sector's capacity or 
access to infmmation needed for it effectively to implement its preventive 
measures. Whether state authorities like financial intelligence units have 
such capacity and access is addressed in section E. 
Financial institutions and DNFBP have access to a considerable 
amount of data required for effective implementation of preventive 
measures. As a point of access to the financial system, financial institutions 
and DNFBP can demand, inspect, and copy client identity documents. 195 
They also have access to transactions of their own clients and can easily 
keep records of those transactions. 196 Because of relative ease of access to 
ce1iain databases such as company registries, business regist1ies (e.g. Dmm 
and Bradstreet), court records, and conceivably others, they may be able to 
detect false documentation and to make some linlc analysis. 197 Finally, 
financial institutions in particular are expert at how to store money, move 
it, and guard it. 198 They can use this information in using linlc analysis, and 
such knowledge could be used to help develop hypotheses as to how 
launderers might hide transactions or beneficial ownership and control. 199 
Significant issues concerning lack of capacity and access to data 
remain. The first involves determining the beneficial ownership and control 
of legal persons and legal arrangements such as trusts. Companies and 
trusts are often used for laundering purposes in large part because 
disguising ownership and control of the legal person or anangement is 
relatively easy?00 Even though Recommendations 33 and 34 require states 
to provide such infonnation to the public, they are often incapable of doing 
so.201 As a result, the identification of beneficial owners and controllers is 
often completed in an tmsatisfactory fashion.202 
195. This may be a principal reason that client identification is relatively successful. See supra note 
81 and accompanying text. 
196. Tllis may be a principal reason that record-keeping is relatively successful. See supra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
197. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. 
198. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Mismatch Between Stale Power and State Capacity in 
Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. lNT'L L. 15, 25 (2004). 
199. See discussion of link analysis, data mining, and algorithm development supra notes 174-181 
and accompanying text. 
200. See generally FATF, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND 
COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS (2006) (describing how corporate vehicles, including tmsts, can be used 
to hide beneficial ownership and control, and reviewing how this can be accomplished in various 
jurisdictions surveyed). 
201. See e.g. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 57; AUSTRJA MUTUAL 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 221-2, 225; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra 
note 80, at 121-3; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 250, 253; U.K. MUTUAL 
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Another key issue involves access to sufficient data to perform 
adequate linlc analysis. As noted earlier, successful link analysis depends 
on the ability to access as much data as possible. The first problem involves 
transaction data. Financial institutions and DNFBP are aware only of the 
transactions of their own clients and not of clients of other financial 
institutions or DNFBP. If a client engages in a transaction with a client of 
another enterprise the chain or linlc is severed. If financial institutions and 
DNFBP could share data on transactions with every other financial 
institution this problem could theoretically be solved, but concerns over 
client confidentiality and proprietary/competitive concerns would make 
such information sharing difficult at best, especially with respect to foreign 
finns. 203 Even if there were no such concerns, the resulting system would 
mean that eve1y person subject to preventive measures would need access 
to every other person's customer transaction data base. As a result, every 
private sector entity subject to preventive measures would be performing a 
linlc analysis with every customer of every other such entity. It would be 
difficult to justify the added costs of such a bizarrely redundant system. 
The second problem involves access to other data, such as confidential 
government data. While it may be possible to anange access to publically 
available information on criminal charges and convictions, it would be 
difficult if not impossible for private sector entities to have access to tax 
records, police records, immigration and customs records, vehicle 
registries, and supervisory findings. 204Also absent would be previously 
filed suspicious transaction repmis. Under the Recommendations, such 
reports are treated as strictly confidential, not only to protect client's 
legitimate privacy interests, but to ensure that there is no tipping off.205 
Next, typologies and red flag indicators may help in designing 
algorithms, but if those algorithms are not based on appropriate statistical 
analysis they will be of limited use. The private sector does not have access 
to key information required by such an empirical scientific approach. The 
first and foremost is that they have no, or at least greatly limited, access to 
EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 236, 239; !·lONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT; 
supra note 80, at 164-5, 167. 
202. The author of this Article is currently co-leading a study for the World Bank entitled "The 
Misuse of Corporate Vehicles in Grand Comtption Cases: Unraveling the Corporate Veil." A review of 
over 200 cases of money laundering using corporate vehicles and tmsts suggests that accurate 
identification of ownership and control was rarely successful. See World Bank, Component 1 Analytical 
Spreadsheet (February I, 2010), on file with the author of this Article. 
203. Sharing client information with both domestic and foreign law enforcement authorities is 
another matter. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 40; Methodology, supra 
note 10, atCriterinn 40.4.1. 
204. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. 
205. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 14. 
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the dependent variable: a higher probability of money laundering or 
tenorism financing. In fact, a principal complaint of financial institutions 
and DNFBP is that they receive no feedback as to whether their suspicious 
transaction reports are false positives (i.e. result in no further 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions) or are in any way useful in 
uncovering criminal proceeds or terrorism financing.206 Without this most 
basic fonn of feedback, it is impossible to determine if a hypotheses about 
connections between independent variables identified as indicating a higher 
likelihood of laundering or terrorism finance is accurate. This relates to a 
second problem conceming general capacity rather than access to data. 
While financial institutions and at least some DNFBP have expertise in 
financial transactions, there is no reason to believe that they are experts in 
criminal investigations.207 This raises considerable doubt that they would 
be able to form the necessary hypotheses between dependent and 
independent variables, let alone test them. 
5. Other Issues 
On the other hand, there is an obvious benefit to requiring the private 
sector to take over public sector duties for no fee: costs, especially visible 
costs, are shifted from the public budget. This frequently has political 
benefits, even if the result is expressed in higher private sector p1ices. 
There may be other cost-savings involved in private unfunded mandates?08 
We do not know if these were a motivation behind the setting up of the 
cunent system. Another reason may be that the private sector has better, or 
at least more easily obtainable, access to certain key infom1ation than does 
the public sector. 209 
There is one other key issue. The fact that the public sector does not 
use empi1ically-based algorithms means there are no specified independent 
206. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY: FINAL 
REPORT ON FEEDBACK 30, 53 (2007). See, e.g., AUSTRIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 
80, at 144 (no up-to-date guidance); AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 90 
(inadequate feedback on suspicious transaction reports filed); CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, 
supra note 80, at 262 (no feedback on suspicious transaction reports filed) U.K. MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 80, at 148 (no direct feedback); but see HONG KONG CHINA MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 80, at 132 (reporting entity told if suspicious transaction report is subject to further 
investigation and/or analysis; the reporting entity is be advised of the outcome in due course); KPMG 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING SURVEY, supra note I 04, at 8. 
207. Gordon, T1ysts or Ten·01·ists, supra note 4, at 737. 
208. Though one commentator has suggested that there may be instances where there are overall 
costs savings with unfunded government mandates. David A. Dana, The Case far Unjimded 
Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1995). 
209. This is not unique to preventive measures implementation. See, e.g., Fisher, Privatizing 
Regulation, supra note 124, at 141; William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring 
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1821 (1996). 
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variables that trigger investigations. If there were, and these were known by 
money launderers and terrorists, they could change their tactics and 
patterns (i.e. their independent variables) to reduce the likelihood that they 
would be investigated and, therefore, caught. 
E. Public Sector Successes and Failures 
The principal purpose of the financial intelligence unit is to analyze 
suspicious transaction reports and other relevant data to establish whether 
the data contained in the reports provides a sufficient basis to warrant 
transmitting the file for further investigation or for prosecution.2 l0 Through 
examination and analysis, the financial intelligence tmit attempts to 
distinguish truly suspect transactions from those that are only "benignly" 
unusual. 211 In effect, the financial intelligence unit must detem1ine which 
"suspicious" reports are really suspicious. 
Dividing the task of detennining suspicious and really suspicious 
transactions between the private sector and public financial intelligence 
units usually begins with the receipt of a suspicious transaction report, after 
which the financial intelligence unit engages in a two-part analysis. In the 
first part, known as tactical analysis, the financial intelligence unit looks for 
additional information on the persons and transactions involved or other 
elements involved in a pmticular case to provide the basis for fmther 
analysis.m A key element of such tactical analysis is linlc analysis, which 
has been discussed at length above in the context of transaction monitoring 
and suspicious transaction reporting. Financial intelligence units typically 
have available various types of data, including those publically available 
databases to which the private sector has access. 213 It can also have access 
to databases to which the public has no access, such as tax records, police 
records, inunigration and customs . records, vehicle registries, and 
. fi d" ?[ 4 supervlSOlY m mgs.-
Largely because the private sector has little difficulty in identifying 
clients and maintaining records of transactions, financial intelligence units 
have little difficulty in obtaining such records. However, in most instances, 
these records are obtained only by request. 2 l5 The same is true with respect 
to similar infonnation from private sector persons m foreign 
210. SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at VII. 
211. !d. 
212. !d. at VII-6 to 7; IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 57-58. 
213. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
214. Verhelst e-mail, supra note 20. 
215. FATF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 10. 
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jurisdictions.216 In other words, these transactions are not part of a data set 
that is directly accessible to financial intelligence units. This drastically 
cuts down on infonnation available to financial intelligence units, whether 
for link analysis or data mining and algotithm development. 
There are a few exceptions to this general rule. First, although not 
required under the Recommendations, the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, as well as some developing countries like the Philippines, require 
automatic reporting of certain types of financial transactions to financial 
intelligence units.217 One type of transaction that results in automatic 
reporting is cash transactions, which require financial institutions or 
DNFBP to report all cash transactions greater than a ce1iain amount. There 
are good reasons for having such a rule. In the paradigm case of laundering 
the proceeds of illegal drug sales, traffickers tend to be paid in cash.218 In 
order to avoid use of large amounts of cash (which can be bullcy and can 
invite unwanted attention) the criminal needs to enter the cash into the 
fmmal financial system via a financial institution. Doing so is refened to as 
the "placement stage."219 One of the first anti-money launde1ing principles 
was to require financial institutions (especially banks, which are usually the 
point of entry in the financial system for cash) to identify exactly who their 
customers were and to repoti to the authorities whenever a customer 
deposited a substantial amount of cash.220 The United States, for example, 
has long had automatic cash transaction reporting rules (for amounts in 
excess of$ 1 0,000), as have a number of other countries.221 Another type of 
automatic rep01iing is international wire transactions. A number of 
jurisdictions, including Canada and Australia, require financial institutions 
to report to their financial intelligence units either transactions above a 
ce1iain sum (Canada)222 or all transactions regardless of amotmt 
216. FA TF 40 Recommendations, supra note 3, at Recommendation 40; Methodology, supra note 
10, at Criterion 40.4.1. 
217. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 148; CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT, supra note 80, at 159; AUSTRALIA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 86-87; 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: DETAILED ASSESSMENT REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMB A T!NG THE FINANCING OF TERRORJSM 145 (2009) (copy on file with the author). 
218. See supra note 4. 
219. SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at I-7. 
220. Gordon, Tiysts or Terrorists, supra note 4, at 708. 
221. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 148. 
222. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) collects 
repmis related to any cross-border electronic funds transfer in an amount of $10,000 (CAN) or more. 
CANADA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 159. See also FINTRAC, What Must be 
Reported? Electronic Funds Transfer, available at 
http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/reporting-declaration/Info/rptEFT-eng.asp. 
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(Australia).223 An analysis by FinCEN suggested that such data, by 
extending link analysis, can have significant benefits in uncovering 
laundering.224 FinCEN recently proposed a regulation requiring such 
reporting in the United States.225 FinCEN sought to address concerns of 
reporting persons that such repmiing would significantly raise costs in part 
by calling for "increasing the use of technology to automate and 
standardize the transfer of data from financial instih1tions, FinCEN, and 
law enforcement agencies." 226 
Following tactical linlc analysis, the financial intelligence unit 
typically unde1iakes operational analysis. Operational analysis uses tactical 
information to formulate different hypotheses on the possible activities of 
the suspect to produce operational intelligence for use by investigators. It 
uses: 
all sources of information available to the Fill [financial intelligence 
unit] to produce activity patterns, new targets, relationships among the 
subject and his or her accomplices, investigative leads, criminal 
profiles, and-where possible-indications of possible future 
behavior. One of the teclmiques of operational analysis used in some 
financial intelligence units is financial profiling. 227 
Based on such analysis, the financial intelligence unit may or may not 
disseminate a report for further investigation.228 
Another important function of the financial intelligence unit is 
strategic analysis, or developing relevant knowledge on techniques of 
latmdering or terrorism financing. Examples include "the identification of 
evolving criminal patterns in a pmiicular group or the provision of broad 
insights into emerging patterns of criminality. "229 The financial intelligence 
unit can then use these for its own operational analysis of suspicious 
transaction repmis through linking as well as to develop guidelines, 
223. AUSTRALlA MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 80, at 86; see also AUSTRAC, 
International jimds transfer instructions, available at http://www.austrac.gov.au/inter_funds_transfer 
.html. 
224. FinCEN, CROSS-BORDER ELECTRONIC FUNDS, supra note 72, at 5-l 0. 
225. Cross-Border Electronic Transmittals of Funds, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,377 (proposed Sept. 30, 
2010). 
226. !d. at 60,3 78. 
2"27. IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 59. 
228. !d. at 60. 
229., SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 9, at VII-7; !MF, FINANCIAL lNTELUGENCE UNITS, 
supra note 71, at 59-60. 
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typologies etc. for use by financial institutions and DNFBP.230 This 
generally follows the system used by FinCEN in the United States. 231 
However, as is the case with the private sector, financial intelligence 
units do not use regression analysis or discriminant function analysis to test 
hypotheses.232 One of the reasons they may not do so is that regression 
analysis or discriminant analysis require knowledge of the independent as 
well as the dependent variables. Although financial intelligence lmits can 
request and receive records on specific transactions, they do not 
automatically have access to all h·ansactions. Because financial intelligence 
units do not use these analytical tools, methodologies and "red flags" are 
made on human hunches or "idiosyncratic assessments" that have no 
proven statistical accuracy.233 As noted earlier, Part II will discuss how 
some tax administrations use statistical analysis to select income taxpayers 
and retums for audit. 
Another failure of fmancial intelligence units is their interaction with 
the private sector. They provide inadequate feedback, including assistance 
in designing preventive measures systems or data on the usefulness of 
suspicious activity reports. Typologies and red flags are not based on 
scientific analysis.234 Exactly why they do not is open to some speculation. 
Perhaps the most likely reason for not assisting in the design of preventive 
measures systems is that they do not know the best designs. They are not, 
after all, in the business of designing such systems but only of analyzing 
suspicious transaction repmis. Most impmiantly, they do not have access to 
all financial transaction data, which is needed to design such systems 
effectively. It may also be that if they provide too much information on 
how to find potential launderers and terrorists to the private sector, that 
infonnation might get back to the actual launderers and tenmists. In other 
words, the system as it now stands is inherently conh·adictory: the private 
sector needs the financial intelligence unit's knowledge to design and 
implement effective preventive measures systems, but the financial 
intelligence unit dare not provide too much infonnation for fear of such 
infonnation actually helping criminals and tenorists. 
F. Summary and Conclusions 
Preventive measures for money laundering and terrorism financing 
have not worked well. This is because the cunent system is based on a 
230. IMF, FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, supra note 71, at 60. 
231. U.S. MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 34, at126-35. 
232. Verhelsl e-mail, supra note 20. 
233. SCHAUER, supra note 175, at 92. 
234. See supra text accompanying note 182. 
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faulty themy of how such duties should be divided. The preventive 
measures standard-by requiring financial institutions and DNFBP to 
design and implement requirements that are poorly described, expensive, 
and unfunded-invites failure. Given that the private sector's main motive 
is profit, theory would predict that it would seek to reduce its costs by 
spending as little as possible on implementing those requirements. Because 
of their subjective nature, it is possible for the private sector to define 
downward its duties without fear of sanction. In addition, the requirements 
describe a mandate that the private sector has little objective capacity to 
implement, even if it wanted to. 
The Recommendations are, with respect to designing and 
implementing a profiling, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting 
system, too vague and subjective. Also, there is little feedback or assistance 
from the public sector in refining these responsibilities. While it is no doubt 
possible to make the wording clearer, as well as to implement improved 
guidance and feedback it is difficult to see how to make the system itself 
significantly less subjective and open to interpretation. Govemments, by 
having put the burden of designing these systems on to the private sector, 
have never had to perform the necessary research and analysis to come up 
with effective systems themselves, suggesting they probably do not now 
have adequate expertise and essential data to do so. And even if they did, 
they cannot provide too much infmmation for fear of such infonnation 
actually helping criminals and tenorists. This inherent contradiction in the 
system makes a resolution more or less impossible. 
As long as system design and implementation is an unfunded private 
mandate, incentives will tend to militate in favor of a less expensive and 
therefore less comprehensive or effective system. In theory it might be 
possible to pay the p1ivate sector by offering bounties for success, meaning 
for suspicious transaction reports that lead to further investigations, and 
perhaps to eliminate the perceived safe harbor for filing false positives. 
However, these could be expensive and could act as a detenent to filing 
suspicious transaction reports. 
One theoretical possibility would be to de-privatize the system, 
tuming it over to the public sector to design and implement. By tuming all 
analytical tasks to the public sector, there would be no need for the private 
sector to design or implement a selection system. The cunent system 
requires the govemment to examine reports from the private sector and 
dete1mine which of those reports should be further investigated; in effect, 
to detetmine which "suspicious" reports are really suspicious. Dividing 
these tasks between the private sector and public financial intelligence units 
is inherently inefficient. Eliminating the division would address the 
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problem. In the current system, each individual private party has access to 
its own client databases but not to that of any other private party, and 
concems over confidentiality, competition, and massive redundancy makes 
the possibility of sharing such databases highly unlikely. Next, private 
parties do not have access to confidential databases that financial 
intelligence units have. Finally, while financial intelligence units have 
access to those databases, they do not have access to the various private 
sector client transaction databases, except in certain instances such as cash 
or international wire reporting. This problem could be solved, at least with 
respect to domestic private parties, if the system of linlc analysis were to be 
de-privatized and all client identification and financial transactions were to 
be reported to state financial intelligence units. It may also be easier to 
define with clarity and objectivity such a private sector responsibility, 
obviating many of the problems of subjectivity that ctmently exist with the 
cunent system of privatized obligations. While some difficulty in 
confinning beneficial owner and controller would remain, the 
responsibility for providing much of this data is already primarily a public 
sector duty. 
Tuming all responsibilities for monitoring and identifying suspicious 
transactions to financial intelligence units would also eliminate the need for 
the private sector to develop expe1iise in those areas. It would also 
eliminate the need for the public sector to provide any assistance in 
designing such systems or to supervise their implementation. 
In order for financial intelligence units to complete operational 
analysis, however, it would also be necessary for the private sector to 
convey to them infonnation on client profiles. While identification and 
transaction records are relatively simple to detennine and maintain, 
profiling is a far more subjective requirement. However, this is due to the 
fact that what constitutes non-criminal or nonnative transactions is not 
spelled out in clear detail. In themy it might be possible to define such a 
data field with greater accuracy. 
Another problem is the failure of both private sector persons and 
financial intelligence units to use empirically and statistically-based 
analysis. Cunently the private sector does not have the incentive or the 
infonnation necessmy to do so. The public sector also does not have access 
to all the p1ivate sector-held customer profiling and transaction data that 
constitutes many of the relevant independent vmiables. This problem may 
be obviated if financial intelligence w1its were tasked with using scientific 
methods of regression or discriminant analysis and if they had access to the 
data currently not reported to them by the private sector. Once a 
scientifically-derived algorithm is detennined, financial intelligence units 
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could complete operational analysis and create reports for immediate 
refenal to investigators. They could determine the most important 
parameters, such as likelihood of catching significant criminal proceeds or 
tenorism financing. Additional benefits of such a system would be 
avoiding the problems inherent in non-fact based profiling and in turning 
over to the private sector the secret list of indicators that trigger money 
laundering and teiTorism financing investigations by the public sector. 
As will be seen in Part II, keeping these responsibilities in the public 
sector is essentially the path taken by most tax administrations, thus 
allowing amalgamation of data from all private sector reporting persons 
with other confidential data accessible only by the public sector, and 
permitting the use of statistical analysis to select taxpayers and returns for 
audit. 
There are a few disadvantages to making the system public. First, 
there could be public opposition based on fears of turning so much private 
financial data over to a governmental organization. In 1999, privacy 
concerns were key in defeating a proposed regulation235 that would have 
implemented customer identification, account monitoring, and suspicious 
transaction reporting in the United States, although there was as much 
concern with banks holding such information with transaction reporting to 
FinCEN.236 However, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
these requirements were spelled out in the USA PATRIOT ACT, which 
passed easily,237 and there have been few if any significant complaints 
voiced in the U.S. Congress since then about such requirements. Turning 
more financial transaction information over to a govenunental agency may 
spark additional privacy concerns, both in the United States and elsewhere. 
However, a privacy advantage to such a system would be that private 
financial institutions and DNFBP would no longer be required to monitor 
accounts. Additional concems could be addressed by strengthening, where 
needed, of data protection mles at financial intelligence units. While tax 
administrations have access to far less data than would financial 
intelligence units under such a system, there has been little complaint 
expressed about privacy concerns in the tax area. 
235. Know Your Customer, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,524 (proposed Dec. 7, 1998) (withdrawn Mar. 23, 
1999). 
236. Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and the Changing 
Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REo. 671,677-
80 (2004). While a senior staff member of the International Monetary Fund the author of this Article 
visited the Chief of Staff of an influential Senate Banking Committee member who assured the author 
that the purpose of the rule was to help the government identify clients who owned guns lay the 
groundwork for their confiscation. 
237. ld. at 683. 
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Another disadvantage is that public sector costs would be higher, 
which canies political costs. However, because there would be no 
redundancy among the many private parties who now must develop and 
implement their own systems for client monitoring there should be a 
significant overall savings in total implementation costs. Also, there would 
likely be significant political suppmi from the fmancial sector, which 
would see significant savings, and also from civil servants who work for 
financial intelligence units, who would see work load, including budget 
support, increase significantly. It might even be possible to raise financing 
through a financial institution user fee. 238 Because the preventive measures 
system includes not only money launde1ing but tenorism financing, it may 
be easier politically to increase public funding than it would be for other 
programs. 
II. FAILURES AND SUCCESSES IN SELECTING INCOME TAX 
RETURNS FOR AUDIT 
A. System Overview 
As it tums out, certain tax administrations select tax returns for audit 
in a manner analogous to some of the proposals suggested above for 
reforming the system of preventive measures. If they can work for income 
tax they could also work for anti-money laundering and terrorism 
financing. 
Unlike the anti-money laundering system, there is no single global 
standard for the design and implementation of tax administrations.239 That 
being said, a number of tax authorities from advanced counhies, including 
the United States, have developed administrative systems that share many 
features. A key function of these systems is to improve compliance with 
revenue laws. While there are many facets to compliance, taxpayer audits 
are a critical component.240 h1 the course of an audit, tax administrations 
examine a pmiicular taxpayer to determine whether that taxpayer has 
238. Not surprisingly, public sector unions concerning are typically opposed to growth and 
aggrandizement of private sector policing. Stephen Schneider, Privatizing Economic Crime 
El?{orcement: Exploring the Role of Private Sector investigative Agencies i11 Combating lt1oney 
Laundering, 16 PoLIClNG & Soc. 285, 304 (2006). This would reverse the process. 
239. While the FA TF 40 Recommendations and IX Special Recommendations are widely accepted 
as a global standard, some features of income tax administration are becoming something like global 
standards. See Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law, supra note 15, at 584-87, 588-89. 
240. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT: AUDIT CASE SELECTION SYSTEMS 5 (2004), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecdf44/36/33818568.pdf [hereinafter OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK 
MANAGEMENT]. 
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complied with her or his obligations lmder the law.24! A key facet of a tax 
administration's audit program is the selection of persons for audit.242 This 
Part draws an analogy between the selection of individual income 
taxpayers for audit by tax administrations and the selection of customers of 
persons subject to preventive measures for investigation by fmancial 
intelligence units. 
As discussed in Part I of this Article, the implementation of private 
sector preventive measures for money laundering and terrorism financing 
involve two groups. The first consists of private sector financial 
institutions and DNFBP who must examine and report on certain activities 
of their clients. With respect to the tax audit function, however, the private 
sector consists of two groups: third parties who file reports with the tax 
authority concerning other taxpayers, and taxpayers themselves who file tax 
declarations, known as 'returns' in the United States. As cunently 
constituted private sector preventive measures require the private sector to 
make judgments as to the likelihood that a particular customer has 
committed money laundering or tenmism financing. Those who provide 
third party information reporting do not have to make any similar 
judgments. It is the tax administration that makes the decision whether to 
audit a taxpayer, not the third party. 
B. Role of the Private Sector 
The income tax involves the computation of tax due based, in pmi, on 
applying a tax rate to the net of taxable gross income and allowable 
deductions. Therefore, key aspects of income tax administration include 
ensuring that all taxable gross income is included and that only allowable 
deductions are subtracted, and· that the proper tax rate is applied _to this net. 
Not surprisingly, income tax administration focuses to a large extent on 
these items of inclusion and deduction. Third party information returns also 
tend to focus on these items, particularly items of income. 
Third party information reporting is a common feature of developed 
country tax systems.243 As with infonnation reporting by persons subject to 
preventive measures for money laundering and tenorism financing, third 
parties are not compensated for their efforts, making the system another 
example of an unfunded private mandate. 244 For example, in the United 
States there is a wide array of third-party information reporting 
241. !d. at 6. 
242. !d. at 9. 
243. Id at l 0-12. 
244. Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax: Information, 49 B.C. L. REv. 605, 
6!2-!3 (2008) [hereinafter Dean, The Incomplete Global lvfarket]. 
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requirements. 245 U.S. payers of wages, interest, or dividend income must 
repmi those payments, while brokers must repmi the amounts realized from 
securities sales.246 
As is the case with financial institutions and DNFBP, third party 
repmiers are subject to sanctions for failure to implement their duties.247 
However, unlike the suspicious transaction reporting system, which 
requires extensive decision-making in the context of a highly subjective 
system, the third party reporting system is highly objective. All that is 
required of the third party repmier is to identify the taxpayer, the payment 
to the taxpayer, and repmi both to the tax authority.248 There are 
uncompensated costs associated with such requirements. However, the 
requirements are relatively straightforward, and third party reporters 
quickly develop expertise with respect to distilling and disseminating this 
infonnation?49 In a manner similar to systems whereby some countries 
require the automatic reporting of cross-border transactions to fmancial 
intelligence units, third party repmiing can be easily automated, often by 
contracting with data management specialists.250 While taxpayers are also 
required to report income and deductions and are subject to sanctions for 
failure to repmi or for reporting incorrectly, they have a direct interest in 
fashioning their declarations to minimize their liability; taxpayer sanctions 
are designed in part to counteract this incentive effect. 251 However, third 
party repmiers have very little direct incentive to misreport in the face of 
'bl . 25? poss1 e sanctiOns. -
Finally, unlike with the preventive measures system, the private sector 
plays no other role in the audit selection system. All analytical tasks, 
including design and implementation, are assigned to the public sector. 
245. I.R.C. §§ 6050A-6050V (201 0) 
246. I.R.C. §§ 6041-42 (2010). 
247. I.R.C. §§ 6652 (2010). 
248. See, e.g., J.R.S. Form W-4 (wages) and I.R.S. Form 1099-Int (interest). There are some 
exceptions to this general rule. For example, in the United States an employee need not report 
reimbursements and deduct expenditures for travel and entertainment if the employer's policy tracks the 
requirements of the Regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (as amended in 1993). In effect, the tax law is 
applied and enforced by the employer. 
249. See Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371,373-76 (2007). 
250. See, e.g., Totally Paperless, http://www.totallypaperless.com/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
251. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, Why do people pay taxes? Prospect The01y Versus Expected 
Utility The01y, 64 1. OF ECON. BEHAVlOR & 0RG. 171, 171-92 (2007) (discussing effects of penalties 
on taxpayer compliance). 
252. See William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border 
Context, 27 VA. TA.X REv. 399, 400-01 (2007) (discussing misreporting in the context of third-party 
estate tax reUU1ls). 
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C. Role of the Public Sector 
The tax administration authority has the sole responsibility to 
determine which taxpayers should be audited. Unlike the private sector 
(and quite possibly the public sector) in the preventive measures systems, 
tax authorities have a specific goal in determining which taxpayers to audit: 
they generally base their decisions on estimates of the degree of risk of 
understatement of tax due multiplied by the size of the understatement.253 
In order to implement such a goal, tax administrations may use a number of 
teclmiques. These can include matching third party infonnation with that 
provided by the taxpayer in a tax declaration, data-mining with algorithms 
such as discriminant or regression analysis, and "red flag" analysis. One 
would expect details about audit selection strategies to be a well-kept 
secret, otherwise taxpayers would have a roadmap of how to avoid an 
audit.254 
The first technique for deciding which retums to audit is third party 
infmmation return data matching, which is an exception to the "well-kept 
secret" mle. This is such an effective technique that in the United States, 
whenever there is a discrepancy (above a ce1iain threshold) between 
infonnation provided in a self-reported tax retum information and the 
information repmied by third parties, the Internal Revenue Service of the 
U.S. automatically sends a notice that taxes are due without bothering to go 
2--
through the audit process first. )) The Internal Revenue Service has 
augmented its data-matching by deriving useful additional material from 
sources other than third-party reporters. 256 In fact, it is because taxpayers 
are aware that the govemment is receiving third-party infonnation that they 
are far less likely to try and cheat with respect to items subject to such 
. 257 
reportmg. 
253. See information on the U.S., U.K., and France, OECD, Compliance Risk Management, supra 
note 240, at 14-15, 33-34, 45. "The IRS has been traditionally focused on the magnitude of potential 
audit adjustments." Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the 
Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 583-84 (2006). 
254. Raskolnikov, supra note 253, at 583. 
255. Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. Graetz, & Louis L. Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax 
Er!lorcement, 1978-1988, 43 TAX LAW. 893, 90! (1989-1990) [hereinafter Dubin eta!., The Changing 
Face]. 
256. For example, data on dependents (which can result in deductions from income) are obtained 
from various government sources. See Nina E. Olson, Closing the Ta~ Gap: Minding the Gap: A Ten-
Step Program For Better Tar Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 7, 8 (2009). 
257. Leandra Ledennan, Statutor)' Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tm: Compliance, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007); James Aim, John Deskins & Michael McKee, Third-Party Income 
Reporting and Income Tm Compliance 2-3 (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Working Paper 
No. 06-35, 2006), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/2006/index.htm. 
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The next teclmique is the use of algorithms such as discriminant or 
regression analysis, the gold standard for detennining the statistical 
relationship between dependent and independent vmiables and one not used 
by any party in the preventive measures system. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development has identified the United States 
and the United Kingdom as using such systems.258 The U.S. system uses a 
discriminant function analysis.259 According to the Intemal Revenue 
Service, a Discriminm1t Function System ("DIF") score rates each taxpayer 
retum for the potential for change, based on past IRS experience with 
similar retums. In particular, an: Unreported Income DIF ("UIDIF") score 
rates the reh1m for the potential of umeported income. Intemal Revenue 
Service personnel then screen the highest-scoring retums, "selecting some 
for audit and identifying the items on these retums that are most likely to 
need review." 260 While the Internal Revenue Service has admitted to using 
such a system, the process of the analysis is "one of the best kept secrets in 
govemment." 261 Prior to the institution of the DIF system, about half of all 
Intemal Revenue Service audits resulted in no tax change; afterward only 
one-fifth showed no change (although this fact gives no indication of the 
change in magnih1de of the additional taxes recovered).262 
Because the govemment enforces strict secrecy over the details of the 
DIF system, some speculation is required as to the true nature of the 
program. In order to design a discriminate function, one must fn·st 
fommlate a hypothesis about the relationship between dependent variable 
(risk of understatement of tax or income multiplied by size of 
understatement) and possible independent variables; in order to test that 
hypothesis sufficient data must first be collected. Begi1ming in 1963, such 
data was collected through the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement 
Program, whereby the Intemal Revenue Service undertook thorough audits 
of representative samples of individual income tax retums approximately 
every three years.263 This program of data collection was abandoned 
because of the burden placed on those taxpayers who had the bad luck to be 
selected for audit/64 but it has been replaced with National Research 
258. OECD, COMPLJANCE RJSK MANAGEMENT, supra note 240, at 14-15, 34-35. 
259. IRS, The Examination (Audil) Process (2006), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,id 
=151888,00.html [hereinafter IRS, Examination (Audit) Process]. 
260. !d. 
261. Dubin eta/., The Changing Face, supra note 255, at 900. 
262. Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer 
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1261-62 (2003) [hereinafter Brown & Mazur, 
The National Research Program]. 
263. !d. at 1261-62. 
264. !d. at 1263. 
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Program, a data collection program that relies on audit information as well 
as added data obtained from vmious confidential government sources and 
public records (e.g., current and prior addresses, real estate holdings, 
business registrations, and corporate records).265 Obviously, while limited, 
this system is far more scientific than that used either by the private or 
public sector in implementing suspicious activity reporting and referral of 
cases for investigation. 
While the discriminate function is a secret, it appears that the number 
of independent variables is limited. At least in pmi for this reason, the 
Internal Revenue Service does not rely solely on discriminant function 
analysis to select retums for audit. Like financial institutions and DNFBP, 
the Internal Revenue Service, as well as many other developed countly tax 
administrations,266 uses more subjective "red flag" types of reviews. 267 
While one can assume these are based on experience, one can also assume 
that they are more imprecise than the more scientific discriminant function 
analysis. 268 
Apparently in order to make red flag application more standardized 
and automated, the Internal Revenue Service has developed the Dependent 
Data-based System. This is a risk identification system powered by mles 
with each rule identifying "non-compliant indicators" (i.e. red tlags); if the 
rule conditions are met the rule "fires." Each fired rule receives points 
based on established scming methodologies. By 2004, only a few mles 
have been included, but the Internal Revenue Service stated that it was 
working to expand the number.269 The U.S. also uses other far more general 
criteria to determine audits. 
Given the opportlmity to collect more underpaid taxes from fewer 
audits, in advanced jurisdictions like the United States tax authorities audit 
265. IRS, REDUCfNG THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPUANCE 
7 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap _report _final_ 080207_linked.pdf; 
Brown & Mazur, The National Research Program, supra note 262, al 1264-86; Nina E. Olson, supra 
note 256, at 9. 
266. Including Canada, the U.K. and France. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 
240, at 25-26, 34-35, 45. 
267. Raslcolnilcov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation, supra note 253, at 587-94. 
268. An indication of "red flags" are items required in Schedule M-1 which requires the corporate 
taxpayer to reconcile its financial accounting income with the income it reports on its tax return. Some 
of the information required is general; other detailed. The partnership version of Schedule M-1 does not 
even require the disclosure of book-tax differences. !d. at 585. "Even less infom1ation is required of an 
unincorporated sole proprietor on Schedule C to Fonn 1040." Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystijj,ing 
Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289, 296 (2002). Interestingly, this data is not filed by third 
parties, so there is a direct incentive by the taxpayer to misstate. However, apparently the combination 
of incentive to cheat against disincentives from sanctions is sufficient that the I.R.S. still picks up 
significant useful information for its red flags strategy. 
269. OECD, COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 240, at 15-l7. 
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returns of higher income persons more often than those of lower income. 
Also, individuals with wage income only, which is subject to third party 
information reporting, and who do not itemize deductions are also audited 
at a lower rate.270 This system appears to be far more objective and efficient 
than the more subjective red flag systems used by both financial institutions 
and DNFBP and financial intelligence units to spot suspicious transactions. 
It is unknown exactly why the Internal Revenue Service has not 
expanded its discriminant function system to include more independent 
variables, but it may have something to do with the additional expense 
involved and the lack of suppmi for additional funding for the Internal 
Revenue Service.271 
D. Summary and Conclusions 
Because the income tax audit system requires private sector entities to 
repmi only objective information that can be transmitted electronically, it 
has a significant advantage over the preventive measures reporting system, 
suppmiing the proposition that such an "objective infonnation" mle be 
exporied to that system. By turning all analytical tasks over to the public 
sector, there is no need for the private sector to design or implement a 
selection system. This has the benefits of eliminating the need for the 
private sector to develop expe1iise in tax administration and audit selection. 
It also eliminates the need for the public sector to provide any assistance in 
designing such systems, or to supervise their implementation. It also 
eliminates vi1tually all negative p1ivate sector incentive effects, including 
those relating to implementation and non-fact based profiling. Finally, there 
is no inherent contradiction between developing an effective system for 
audit selection and keeping such a system out of the hands of possible tax 
cheats: no private sector person is involved in audit selection. 
By truning all information and analytical responsibilities to the public 
sector, which is the sole repository of expe1iise on non-compliance, it is 
possible for tax administrations to develop a scientifically-based system of 
audit selection. Instead of relying solely on even educated guesses, the 
discriminant function system gum·antees a higher level of con-elation 
between dependent and suspected independent variables of tax non-
compliance. This reduces the need for red flag based selection. However, 
by placing both all expertise and red flag based activities in one entity, 
greater quality and greater consistency are likely than they would be if split 
270. Raskolnilcov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation, supra note 253, at 583-84. 
271. Confidential Interview, I.R.S. District Director, in Cambridge, Mass. (May I, 1994). 
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into many entities. This is clearly an advantage over the preventive 
measures system. 
Another major advantage is that the statistically-based techniques used 
to select returns for audit are kept as secret as possible fi·om the public, 
making it harder for the private sector to develop techniques that would 
avoid triggering an audit. One disadvantage is that public sector costs are 
higher than they would be if additional duties were turned to the private 
sector. 
III. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES FOR MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM 
FINANCING 
Based on the above analysis, a rethought system of preventive 
measures for money laundering and tenorism financing would radically 
shift the burden from private entities to one public entity. By requiting 
financial institutions and DNFBP to design and implement requirements 
that are poorly described, expensive, and unfunded, the F ATF 
Recommendations invite failure. Given that the private sector's main 
motive is profit, one would reasonably predict that it would seek to reduce 
costs by spending as little as possible on implementing those requirements. 
Because of the Recommendations' subjective nature, it is possible for the 
p1ivate sector to define downward its duties without fear of sanction. In 
addition, the requirements describe a mandate that the plivate sector has 
little objective capacity to implement, even if it wanted to. 
A rethought system would eliminate all but the most objective and 
least expensive unfunded private sector mandates. Specifically, private 
sector persons cunently tasked with client identification, profiling, record-
keeping, monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting would be 
required to perfonn only the first two tasks. Added to this would be a 
requirement to transmit certain profiling infonnation and all financial 
transactions. Client profiling information, however, would be strictly 
defined; a limited number of data fields would be spelled out by the 
financial intelligence unit. Transaction data would include all client 
transactions of any kind, domestic or international, perhaps in excess of a 
certain de minimis limit. All data would, where possible, be transmitted 
electronically. 
All other aspects of the preventive measures system would be 
allocated to the government. This would eliminate the cunent private-
sector cost-savings disincentive effects in the cunent system. The current 
system requires the govenunent to examine repmis from the private sector 
and detennine which of those reports should be fmiher investigated; in 
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effect, to detennine which "suspicious" repmis are really susp1c10us. 
Dividing the search for the suspicious and the really suspicious betvveen the 
p1ivate sector and public financial intelligence units seems inherently 
inefficient. Because the government has far greater access to impmiant 
data, it would also vastly increase the capacity of the system to design and 
implement an effective system for identifying likely criminals and 
tenmists. 
Specifically, financial intelligence units would be tasked with 
analyzing data and determining which clients and transactions should be 
investigated for possible laundering or terrorism financing. They would 
also be required to determine what their specific goals were in doing so. 
With respect to laundering, this would be the probability of laundering 
multiplied by magnitude of laundering. With respect to tenmism finance, 
this could be the probability of financing or some formula of probability 
multiplied by the potential danger that such financing might cause. As is 
now the case, financial intelligence units would be required to send such 
repmis on to law enforcement for investigation. Strict data protection and 
secrecy laws would continue to apply to the financial intelligence unit. 
Financial intelligence units would continue to have access to other 
sources of information as now. They would also perfonn standard link 
analysis, as they do now. However, they would also be tasked with testing 
and improving various hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
independent variables (for example, probability of laundering multiplied by 
magnitude of laundering; probability of terrorism financing multiplied by 
potential danger of financing) and possible dependent variables, many of 
which are now "red flags." They would use regression or discriminant 
function analysis. Because of the resources and time required for such 
empirical and statistical analysis, this would be an ongoing project, with 
additional factors added as research was completed. Because of this, 
financial intelligence tmits would continue to use red flag analysis. 
However, where possible they would automate such analytical work by 
using mle-based programs such as the Intemal Revenue Service's 
Dependent Data-based System. All infonnation conceming data analysis 
and would be kept strictly secret from the public, including financial 
institutions and DNFBP. 
Some problems could still persist. Government bureaucracies are often 
inefficient, and financial intelligence units may have difficulty 
implementing their expanded roles. There may also be political pushback 
because of the greater costs to the public sector budget, or because of a 
perception that the govemment's greater authority could be a threat to 
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individual freedom. But the improvements in catching criminals and 
terrorists in a rethought system should outweigh these potential downsides. 
CONCLUSION 
The current system designed to prevent money laundering and 
terrorism financing does not work well. It is based on a faulty theoretical 
constmction. The F ATF Recommendations require financial institutions to 
design and implement requirements to monitor client transactions and 
report those that raise suspicion of money laundering or tenorism 
financing. However, because these requirements are poorly described, 
expensive, and unfunded, the FATF Recommendations invite failure. 
Because of their subjective nature, it is possible for the private sector to 
define downward its costly duties without fear of sanction. In addition, 
private sector financial institutions do not have sufficient expertise or data 
to design and implement such systems even if they wished to 
The current system also requires the government to examine reports 
from the private sector and determine which of those reports should be 
fhrther investigated; in effect, to determine which "suspicious" repmis are 
really suspicious. Dividing these tasks between the private sector and 
public financial intelligence units is inefficient. Not only does it separate 
data pools into many different private sector parties and the public sector, it 
reduces the overall role of the public sector in doing what it should do best: 
fmding criminals and ten·orists. It also makes the use of empirically based 
analytical tools like regression or discriminant function analysis both 
difficult (by dividing data bases) and unlikely (because the private sector 
has few incentives to spend the money to do so). Finally, it introduces an 
inherent contradiction: the public sector is tasked with infon11ing the 
private sector how best to detect launderers and tenorists, but to do so 
could act as a road map on how to avoid detection should such infon11ation 
fall into the wrong hands. 
These problems can be addressed by h1ming all analytical work to 
public sector financial intelligence units and reserving for the private sector 
only the reporting of certain client profiling data and records of all financial 
transactions. Financial intelligence should be required to use, to the extent 
possible, empirical analysis, results should be far better than the cunent 
system. While such a system would be substantially different from the 
current one, there is considerable precedent in the way in which tax 
administrations select taxpayers for audit investigation. Also, there should 
be significant overall cost savings as redundancies among multiple private 
sector party analytical duties are eliminated. Both the private sector, which 
would experience significant cost reductions, and public sector civil 
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servants, who would see an increase in duties and fmancial support, would 
be expected to support such changes. While these changes would entail a 
larger cost to the public treasmy, because this would in part finance greater 
governmental anti-terrorism work, the added public sector costs might be 
politically acceptable. 
